DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 139 677 SO 009 967

TITLE	International Information, Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future.
INSTITUTION	Georgetown Univ., Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies.
PUB DATE	Mar 75
NOTE	89p.; Some pages in the annexes contain paragraphs of small sized print and may not reproduce clearly
AVAILABLE FROM	Center for strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, N.W., No. 520, Washington, D.C. 20006 ($3.95 plus $0.30 postage, paperback)
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.83 HC-$4.67 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Cultural Education; Cultural Exchange; *Foreign Policy; Futures (of Society); *Global Approach; Government Role; Intercultural Programs; *International Education; International Educational Exchange; *International Relations; Needs Assessment; Policy Formation; *Program Evaluation; Program Improvement; Reports

ABSTRACT

The report analyzes American government programs in international information, education, and cultural relations in order to provide recommendations for program improvement. A history of public diplomacy programs since World War II traces creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Bureau of Cultural Relations (CU) and analyzes their activities in areas of exchange of persons, general information, policy formation, and advisory functions. Objectives of American information and cultural activities are described as support for U.S. foreign policy and promotion of mutual understanding with foreign countries. The responsibilities of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy Information and the activities of the Voice of America broadcast are discussed. Three major problems that the review panel identified are the division of one program between the USIA and the Department of State; the assignment of interpreting U.S. foreign policy to the world and advising in its formulation by a non-State Department agency; and the ambiguous position of the Voice of America between journalism and diplomacy. The panel concluded that these problems could be solved by combining presently fragmented policy and advisory functions into a new State Department Office of Policy Information. (Author/DB)

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SP 009 967

International Information Education and Cultural Relations

Recommendations For the Future

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 75-10696

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Preface

"A decent respect to the opinions of mankind," wrote Thomas Jefferson in 1776. "Diplomacy should proceed always frankly and in the public view," said Woodrow Wilson in 1918.

Concern for foreign opinion and a commitment to the ideal of public diplomacy have been at the heart of American foreign policy for two centuries. They express not only our manner of acting abroad but also, and more significantly, many of the purposes behind our national existence. Today as in the past the United States stands committed to a way of life, to an actionable, realized philosophy of individual freedom and rule by the consent of the governed. That philosophy requires an equally firm belief in open criticism and controversy, in freedom of information about everything, including the United States and American society. These are powerful political ideals; upon them in large part rests the moral leadership which accompanies the exercise of American power in today's world.

American international programs in information, education, and culture are thus not merely a tool of diplomacy or a means of supporting foreign policy, though they are certainly both of these things. Nor are they valuable simply because they express our national identity abroad, thus helping the world understand us and the use we make of our tremendous economic and political power. Beyond these things American programs in information, education, and culture are a means of fulfilling our national identity, of practicing the philosophy in which we believe. Public diplomacy is a central part of American foreign policy simply because the freedom to know is such an important part of America.

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Nevertheless, it should be apparent even to the most casual observer that these activities have absorbed over the years an exceptionally small portion—less than seven percent—even of those public resources allocated to the non-defense side of America's international affairs budget. Fortunately, the United States is well served in this area by the efforts of its citizens overseas in whatever capacity: all of the federal government's educational exchange, for example, is only five percent of the total exchange of persons. But the government's contribution, though small, is an absolutely vital one, for it does the things that the private sector does not do and takes action in places and at times that private individuals might not. Moreover, it has repeatedly demonstrated its success in terms appropriate to its objectives. Letters and oral testimony come from people all over the world who have been reached by the American experience. Government and business leaders hold different views of us, newspaper articles have a different theme because of an exposure to these activities. The evidence is not hard, but it is there in tangible form and it demonstrates that this small expenditure can have impressive results.

The Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations therefore wishes to state at the outset its conviction that these programs deserve all possible support now and in the years ahead. We believe they are an exceptional use of governmental energy and the taxpayer's dollars, and all our recommendations are designed to improve the performance of what we consider a necessary and a noble task. Particular activities may come and go and bureaucracies change their forms and organizations; it is the objective that we consider controlling. The long hours and hard work represented by this Report have been given in service of that ideal.

The Panel began its labors in April 1974, in response to concern expressed over the past few years by several public and private bodies that these programs, established some 25 years ago, be reexamined in the light of today's needs. In February 1968, the U. S. Advisory Commission on Information called for "an in-depth critique," by an organization outside the government, "not only. . . of what USIA does well and what poorly, but of what it ought to be doing and how best it might approach it." It has since repeated that call. Then, in May 1973, the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate indicated its concern by recommending a redistribution of the functions performed by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the State Department's bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU). Finally, in July 1973, the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs decided to investigate how USIA

and CU might rearrange their similar and related functions in a way more suitable both to their effective performance and to the changing directions of U.S. foreign policy. (See Annex I for texts of these reports.)

As a result of these various expressions of concern, the two Advisory Commissions jointly approached Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies to host such a study. Entirely private financing was secured from the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Lilly Endowment and the Ahmanson Foundation. I was invited to serve as Chairman of an independent Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations. Dean Peter Krogh of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service was appointed Vice-Chairman and Walter Roberts, formerly Associate Director of USIA, as Project Director. All members of the U.S. Advisory Commissions on Information and International Educational and Cultural Affairs were appointed members of the Panel, as were several other prominent individuals from the private sector. Their names are listed immediately following this Preface. (See Annex II for Press Release.)

The Panel conducted discussions with many well-informed individuals, including Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his two predecessors, Dean Rusk and William Rogers; the present Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Ingersoll, and other high officials of the State Department; USIA Director James Keogh, practically all of his predecessors, and two former Deputy Directors; John Richardson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and virtually all of his predecessors; more than a dozen Ambassadors; scores of Public Affairs Officers and Cultural Affairs Officers; members of the appropriate committees of Congress and of their staffs; and many others in and out of government. (See Annex III for list.) All of these people have given generously of their time and expertise to our work. Richard Monsen of USIA and Richard Roth of CU have been most helpful in providing the Panel with all necessary information about their organizations.

To the capable staff of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University and its Chairman, Dr. David M. Abshire, go our special thanks for providing administrative support and ensuring conditions conducive to the completely independent work of the Panel within the University's framework.

But there are two men who have been central to the development and completion of this study. Walter R. Roberts, Project Director and a member of the Panel, brought the experience and wisdom from 32 years of U.S. government and foreign service to our deliberations. That he was perusaded to resign from the senior career position in USIA to join the Panel was of singular importance to the

conduct of this review. His assistant, Terry L. Deibel, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University, helped greatly in the design and drafting of the report and his knowledge of the program proved most valuable. Indispensable as their assistance has been, it is of course the members of the Panel who accept full responsibility for the opinions and recommendations which follow.

The United States has an opportunity to make its international information, educational, and cultural efforts more effective in today's interdependent world. Toward the achievement of this end we submit this report.

Frank Stanton
Chairman

Washington
March 15, 1975

Members of the Panel

Frank Stanton, Chairman	Chairman, American National Red Cross
Peter Krogh, Vice Chairman	Dean, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
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John M. Shaheen	Member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information; President, Shaheen Natural Resources Company, Inc.

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William C. Turner***	Member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; President, Western Management Consultants, Inc.

NOTE: Underlining indicates Executive Committee.

*Because of other commitments, was unable to participate in most of the Panel's interviews and its deliberations.

**Requested on January 27, 1975 that abstention from final report be noted.

***Resigned August 11, 1974 following his appointment as American Ambassador to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

I. History and Review of Present Program

THE United States program in the field of international information, education, and cultural relations is the result of many and varied expansions, contractions, and reorganizations since the end of World War II.

Prior to the war there existed only a small effort, concentrated in the field of cultural relations with the Western Hemisphere and executed through a Division of Cultural Cooperation in the Department of State. Only in the Latin American area did the Department have cultural attachés; press attachés did not exist anywhere. Whatever had to be done in the press field was carried out by the Ambassador and his staff.

All this changed during World War II, and information activities were organized on a large scale. When the war ended in August 1945, President Truman asked Secretary of State James Byrnes to plan a permanent peace-time program. In response to that request an Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) was established and placed under an Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. It operated for over two years without any legal authorization other than that implied in appropriations acts. In the fall of 1947, OIC was renamed the Office of International Information and Educational Exchange (OIE).

On January 27, 1948, President Truman approved the Smith-Mundt Act which, for the first time in American history, committed the Government in time of peace to conduct international information, education, and cultural exchange activities on a worldwide, long-term scale. The objectives of the Act were, as stated by Congress, "to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries."

Under the new law, the old OIE was divided into two new offices, both of which remained under the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. The Office of International Information retained the "fast media" functions (radio, press, film), while the Office of Educational Exchange acquired responsibility for the "slow media" (exchange of persons, libraries). In 1952 these two new offices in their turn were consolidated in a semi-autonomous organization within the Department of State, the International Information Administration.

Yet the most far reaching organizational change was to come under the Eisenhower Administration on the combined recommendations of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the President's Advisory Commission on Governmental Organization (the Rockefeller Commission). Both agreed that the organizational pattern of the 1940's ought to be reversed and the information program separated from the State Department. Accordingly, in its Memorandum No. 14 of April 9, 1953, the Rockefeller Commission recommended the establishment of an independent Foreign Information Agency, subject only to policy guidance from the Secretary of State. Upon learning of this recommendation, however, two other study committees then working in the field of information and cultural programs addressed interim communications to the President, stating their contrary opinion that the programs ought to remain in the Department of State. (These were the William H. Jackson Committee, established by Eisenhower in January 1953, and the older legislative study committee headed by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper.)

USIA Created

In spite of their dissent, the President decided to go ahead without awaiting the final reports of either the Jackson or Hickenlooper Committees. On June 1, 1953, he submitted to the Congress Reorganization Plan No. 8, establishing the United States Information Agency (USIA) which absorbed the activities of the IIA. Upon the Hickenlooper Committee's recommendation, the exchange of persons program was not transferred to the new agency but remained part of the State Department, in order to avoid "giving the educational exchange of persons a propaganda flavor." Overseas, however, the new agency was given operational responsibility for the exchange program.

In 1958, the Rockefeller Commission, whose recommendation had been so important in the creation of the independent USIA, changed its mind. On December 6 it proposed to the President that the USIA be brought into the Department of State under an Under Secretary for International Cultural and Information Affairs who would also be responsible for the cultural and exchange programs.

Secretary Dulles was no longer opposed to having USIA activities in the Department, and in March 1959 legislation was drawn up aimed at returning USIA to State as a semi-autonomous organization headed by an Administrator—the status occupied by the foreign aid organization which had been transferred to State in 1955. The long delay in drafting a bill resulted in a White House decision in August of 1959 not to forward it to Congress because of the latter's intention to adjourn in September.

The bill was not sent to Congress at the next session either, presumably because on December 2, 1959, President Eisenhower established the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (the Sprague Committee). That Committee, however, did not concern itself with organizational matters, and in the twilight of the Eisenhower presidency the idea of returning USIA to State was quietly dropped. In the State Department, however, the exchange of persons program and the overseas cultural presentations program (which had been inaugurated in 1954) were removed from the Public Affairs area in 1959 and placed in a newly created Bureau of International Cultural Relations (CU).

CU Created

In 1960, President-elect John F. Kennedy set up various task forces, one of which dealt with USIA and the cultural program. It recommended revising the role of USIA by transfering to it CU's activities and renaming it the International Exchange or U.S. Cultural Exchange Agency. Kennedy did not act on the proposal, but instead elevated the Cultural Bureau in the State Department, which had been headed by a Special Assistant, to Assistant Secretary level. The Bureau was also significantly strengthened by the passage of the Fulbright-Hays Act in 1961, which provided for increasing "mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries . . . by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests . . . of the people of the United States and other nations." (Origins of USIA and CU, Annex IV.)

For 14 years now, the organizational arrangement of USIA and the Cultural Bureau of the Department of State have remained essentially unchanged. USIA, outside and independent of the State Department, has been relied upon to "tell America's story to the world," a responsibility including both the explanation and defense of U.S. foreign policy and the dissemination of general information about life and thought in these United States. Because of its involvement with foreign policy, President Kennedy also assigned USIA the task of advising American policy makers on overseas public opinion as a factor they should consider in deciding on viable foreign policies. CU, despite its location within the Department of

State, has had no direct connection with foreign policy; indeed, it has been distinguished from USIA by its separation as an educational and cultural agency from the politics of the foreign policy process and by the fact that it exchanges people, whereas USIA deals in media. CU's programs have thus been considered, not as a one-way effort to get a particular message across overseas, but as providing the opportunity for mutual contact between the United States and other nations on a personal level. As a result, CU has been expected to make an impact in the United States, to build understanding here as well as abroad, whereas USIA was specifically enjoined by law from "propagandizing" the American people.

Structural Problems

The organizational framework for public diplomacy (as the international information and cultural programs are often called), arrived at by the historical process described above, was thus at variance with logic in several obvious respects.

First, certain activities directly related to foreign policy were being performed by an organization separate from the State Department, while, ironically, the part of public diplomacy intended to be insulated from the foreign policy process was located within the Department.

Second, information about American society and the life and thought of its people was being handled by the same persons who were explaining and defending U.S. foreign policy, requiring them to be in touch with two very different kinds of information to be handled in two very different ways.

Third, the organizational separation between USIA and CU deprived USIA of control in Washington over an important tool for its efforts to depict U.S. life and thought overseas (namely, real live American exchangees). Moreover, it seemed to imply that USIA's dissemination of information abroad about U.S. society was not related to CU's efforts to build understanding of the United States overseas.

Finally, the Washington structure was contradicted (and in turn greatly complicated) by the organizational pattern in the field, where CU programs were executed by USIA officials. It was equally clear, however, that the field arrangement brought mutually reinforcing kinds of programming together with impressive effect.

Experience and recent programming trends in USIA and CU have made these logical inconsistencies all the more apparent. In its early years, most of USIA's operations were of necessity on the foreign policy side, waging ideological warfare and heavily dependent on the fastest available media. Today, in an era that actively seeks a relaxation of tensions and where issues are seen to be com-

plex rather than clear-cut, USIA has moved heavily into the cultural field with long-range media. The Panel's study has revealed that only a small percentage of USIA's current work deals with the U.S. foreign policy position; the much larger part of the Agency's effort today is directed at the same longer range objective as the Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Moreover, the newest forms of programming are based on the coordination of people with a variety of media products all relating to the same subject, a sophisticated technique that makes the organizational separation between people and media more obsolete than ever. It was the unanimous opinion of the Public Affairs Officers and Cultural Affairs Officers with whom the Panel met that the overseas program must operate as a unit, and both they and the current heads of USIA and CU agree that the successful functioning of U.S. public diplomacy has been in spite of—rather than because of—the organizational structure in Washington.

The same conclusion is underlined by a glance at how other countries have organized their public diplomacy efforts. It is striking that none has followed the U.S. pattern, in spite of our leadership in so many other areas of free world endeavor. In all cases, the information programs of other countries have been placed in the foreign offices. Culture, on the other hand, is found in some countries inside, but in others outside, the foreign offices, on the theory that although cultural relations can function in the foreign office they need not be there. To be specific: the British information program is in the Foreign Office, the cultural program in the semi-governmental British Council, and the BBC's External Service is set up separately; the French information program is within the political directorate of the Quai d'Orsay, the cultural program has its own directorate also in the Foreign Office, and the shortwave radio is separate; the German information program (together with the domestic information program) is in the Chancellor's office, the cultural program partly in the Foreign Office and partly outside, and the shortwave radio (*Deutsche Welle*) is separate.

USIA and CU Activities Analyzed

Logic, recent programming trends, foreign example, and the testimony of officials on both sides of the organizational divide regarding the manifest awkwardness of the current situation thus combined to lead the Panel to an early conclusion that the existing Washington organization could be improved upon. In its efforts to approach that problem, the Panel felt the need to free itself from patterns of thought tied to the old organizational structure and to seek a new logical framework that could be used to categorize on a functional basis the myriad of activities performed by USIA and CU.

In searching for that framework, the Panel was guided by the fact that some activities have an extremely close relationship with the formulation and execution of foreign policy, whereas others perform a support role that is more removed from day-to-day policy concerns. On the basis of this fundamental distinction, it was able to isolate four functions, two in the first category and two in the second, as follows:

1. Exchange of Persons—These programs, both cultural and educational, support the ultimate goals of U.S. policy by promoting the exposure of Americans and people of other nationalities and cultures to each other. Their objectives are thus to build *mutual* understanding in areas most important to preserving friendly and peaceful U.S. relations worldwide and to help develop a reservoir of people who can exchange ideas easily, can identify common objectives, and can work together in achieving these objectives. Their operations should, therefore, be directed with careful attention to long range policy interests. Close connection with the day-to-day policy process is not required.

2. General Information—This function involves the dissemination overseas of general information about American society and American perceptions of world affairs rather than specific information about U.S. foreign policy. It is the portrayal of American society overseas, including subjects traditionally labeled "cultural" (such as music, literature, and film making), but also subjects of international and public politics (e.g., energy, inflation, economics, ecology, American history). Here U.S. officials act as one side in a protracted dialogue, reflecting not immediate government policy but the life and views of the American people. The purpose is to support foreign policy, by building the context within which policy is understandable and by creating a favorable image for the U.S. overseas which will help it be successful. Topics and projects must therefore be selected with an eye to long-range policy objectives, but no intimate connection to daily policy operations is necessary or desirable.

3. Policy Information—This function includes the official articulation and explanation of U.S. foreign policy overseas; it is the presentation of the U.S. Government stance on foreign policy questions of immediate concern; indeed, it *is* policy to those who hear it and do not experience American actions directly. This function requires access to policy makers sufficient to ensure detailed knowledge of what policy is, the dispatch of policy guidance to officers in the field, and the articulation of policy by those officers to the foreign audience. Its close association with the day-to-day making of foreign policy is essential.

4. Advisory—This function involves making available to decision makers, for their consideration in the policy formulation process, information on the state of foreign public opinion and predictive analyses as to the effects upon such opinion of potential policy decisions. It is an input to the policy making process and depends for its effectiveness upon informed reporting from the field, relevant analysis, and access to the decision maker. Like the policy information function, this function requires an intimate relationship to the policy process.

Terminology

In order to avoid later confusion, a further word on terminology may be in order here. This report uses the term "cultural" in its broadest sense, not limiting it to arts and letters, manners, scholarly pursuits, and the like, but including the whole wide range of the life and thinking of the American people. "Cultural diplomacy," then, would include activities described above under both the exchange of persons and general information functions. "Information" we have sub-divided into the "policy" and "general" categories, and the report attempts to make clear from the context, or by use of these adjectives, which kind of information it means in a given instance. It may seem confusing to have the second kind of information included in our term "culture," but in doing so we are reflecting the insistence of most PAOs and CAOs that in today's programming there is no meaningful distinction between culture and general information. The distinction, rather, is between the broad "cultural" activities included in the general information and exchange of persons functions, on the one hand, and the foreign policy-related advisory and policy information functions, on the other.

The body of the Panel report follows the above analytical framework. Chapters II and III deal with the first and second functions listed above, which in the Panel's view belong together as programs that relate to the portrayal of American society. Chapter IV treats the third and fourth functions, because both relate to the presentation of immediate U.S. policy. Chapter V takes up the special case of the Voice of America. Finally, the report concludes with some practical considerations, including an explanation of how its recommendations might most practicably be put into effect.

II. Objectives for American Information and Cultural Activities

PUBLIC support for the general information and exchange or persons dimensions of U.S. international relations (the first and second functions above) has been justified over the years on two basic levels. First, and most important in the view of the executing agencies themselves, has been the support these programs provide for U.S. foreign policy. However, alongside this objective there has always been a second one, less often articulated but originally cited by Congress as the primary reason for establishing both programs. This goal is the promotion of mutual and reciprocal understanding of the United States abroad and of other countries here, both as an end in itself and as an essential basis for a peaceful world order.

The Panel believes that both objectives remain valid and have actually increased in importance.

As to the first, the experience of USIA and CU clearly shows the need to inform people of other cultures about American society and about American perceptions of world affairs before they can be expected even to comprehend, let alone identify with, U.S. foreign policy. The second objective, admittedly, is far more difficult to justify. Nevertheless, it is clearly within the U.S. national interest. While understanding alone will not guarantee either peace or cooperation, without understanding, nations are less likely to define areas where they can cooperate and to pursue this cooperation to mutual advantage. If we are to work with peoples who are very different from ourselves, we must understand them and they must understand us. While not susceptible to scientific proof, then, the value of mutual understanding is accepted as a matter of faith by virtually everyone with broad international experience. The Panel reaffirms its belief that building mutual understanding should be publicly supported by a nation possessing the wealth and world responsibilities of the

United States. It applauds the wisdom and forthrightness of Congress in giving active expression to this belief in the Smith-Mundt and Fulbright-Hays Acts.

Changes in International Environment

The Panel cannot, however, be content with a mere reaffirmation of objectives that guided the program in the 1950s and 1960s. The 1970s are decidedly different times, and the dogmas of even so stormy a past now seem over-shadowed by new realities. In fact, the Panel has been astounded by the way in which developments in international politics, even during its own short existence, have increased the need for these programs and reinforced the objectives they must serve. These changes in the international environment are worth delineating, for they point not only to new reasons for strengthening the performance of the current program but also to ways it should be changed in the future.

In the Panel's view, the events of the last year have added up to a remarkable acceleration in the tangible interdependence of all nations. The crises in energy, in the international monetary system, and in world food distribution have etched in reality the abstractions of mutual dependence formulated by philosophers for centuries past. Beginning decades ago, the modern revolution in communication and transportation technology, together with rapid population growth, have brought the peoples of the world closer together. Today, altogether new sources of conflict have arisen (like the problems of scarce resources and pollution control) which manifest a striking proximity to the basic needs of individuals as well as to the diplomatic maneuverings of statesmen. For democratic governments, this has meant a growth in the impact of foreign on domestic policy and vice versa, making accommodation on the international level ever more intertwined with the satisfaction of the needs of their electorates. If no other evidence were available, the experience of millions of Americans waiting for gasoline last winter is proof enough that today everyone is intimately affected by international relations.

Against our growing awareness of these new problems of interdependence, the old conflicts of traditional international politics remain. The rush to independence of the so-called Third World has recently brought the total United Nations membership to 138, with most of the new governments representing peoples that are ill-clothed, ill-housed, ill-fed. It has become commonplace to note that the benefits of science in health and communications have simply resulted in a world peopled by more dissatisfied human beings; the gap between rich and poor as well as between promise and performance grows wider every day. In the realm of great power relationships, the Panel is not persuaded that the current political detente,

however desirable, means an end to the sharp East-West struggle that has so dominated postwar politics. There are still two very different forms of social and governmental organization in the world, engaged in serious contention on a variety of fronts and armed—all rhetoric aside—as if they meant business. The United States with all its domestic concerns is still looked to by many abroad for leadership in the free world, and today faces the formidable task of asserting its leadership effectively and of persuading a new generation abroad that American policies remain the surest road to a secure and prosperous international order.

Faced with such formidable challenges, both old and new, all Americans must experience a certain anxiety in assessing the ability of the United States to meet them. No one would doubt the difficulty of the situation. Our sudden awareness of dependence has destroyed the myth of American omnipotence; no nation can impose its will in today's world, if ever one could. But to say that the solutions for today's problems must be cooperative should by no means be counsel for despair. Interdependence does not make leadership useless or hopeless, but all the more necessary and rewarding. It may call, to be sure, for a new style of leadership, one that emphasizes new tools and puts old ones to new uses. In the Panel's view, this diplomatic style will be one in which general information and exchange of persons activities must play a broader though different role than in the past, both in supporting foreign policy and in building mutual understanding. In action and in purpose, we are on the threshold of *a new kind of cultural diplomacy.*

New Conditions of International Life

In the Panel's view, then, the following propositions seem self-evident:

1. Among the consequences of growing international interdependence is the prospect that American policies and actions will more than ever be felt abroad. There is, therefore, a greater need to explain the societal context in which those policies and actions are generated.

2. The new issues on the international agenda—energy, environment, food, oceans, population—involve individuals very directly. The societal forces and factors which set in motion the policies intended to address this new agenda of people-oriented issues will have to be explained.

3. In an era of negotiations leading to detente, there are new needs and opportunities to communicate with peoples, many of whom have been cut off from dialogue with us in the postwar period. Detente both requires and makes possible the fuller international expression of American ideas. It enables the United States to

extend the conduct of its cultural diplomacy to countries which until now have been off limits.

4. The rise to significance of non-Western countries, especially in the Middle East and Asia, makes the job of international communications more difficult for the United States. At the same time, the growing importance of countries whose culture differs greatly from our own requires that the United States help them understand what lies behind American policy commitments.

5. While the United States retains considerable, perhaps predominant, power in international affairs, the capacity of America to dictate the course of international events has diminished. This means that the United States will have to count more than ever on explanation and persuasion. The new premium on persuasion makes cultural diplomacy essential to the achievement of American foreign policy goals.

These new conditions of international life not only establish the continuing need for strong governmental support of an expanded information and cultural program but also point to the new style and content it must assume. In the first place, the program must recognize that the communications revolution has educated the world to a greater skepticism concerning the things governments say about their societies. Hence, there is a great need today for credibility, to convince others that a program run by the American Government is presenting an objective picture of American society.

Second, if American leadership is to be redirected toward cooperative solutions to our common problems, the new programs must also be genuinely reciprocal. All too often, programming has seemed to reflect a ballistic concept of communication—a one-way shooting of a message at a target. Today, however, Americans realize that they have much to learn as well as to teach and that cooperative leadership requires good listening as well as persuasive talking. America's new leadership style will thus require dialogue, with the emphasis placed on the "mutual" side of building mutual understanding.

Public Support Justified

These last remarks on mutuality throw a new perspective on the concern with which we began this chapter, namely, the justification for continuing and increasing public support of the information and cultural program. Unquestionably, the conditions of today's international environment have elevated not only the absolute need for these programs (both to build mutual understanding and as backup to U.S. foreign policy) but also their relative importance among the diplomatic tools at our command. In addition, however, the new cultural diplomacy in its mutual aspect will provide direct benefits to

individuals, foundations, educational institutions, and business enterprises—to the hundreds of thousands of past and potential exchangees and the millions more who will benefit from contact with those who come to the United States. The program thus has the opportunity to evolve a genuinely symbiotic relationship with the private sector, rendering benefits far beyond those resulting from a successful foreign policy and in turn multiplying its own resources and impact many times through the efforts of the people it benefits.

To summarize, the Panel considers that new conditions in today's world necessitate both a strengthening of cultural diplomacy and a restructuring of its activities. Its purpose, concisely expressed, would be *to contribute to mutual knowledge and understanding that is increasingly necessary for the effective communication and execution of American policy in cooperation with other nations.* To fulfill this responsibility, the Panel has concluded that the new cultural diplomacy needs a new organizational home, one that will encourage and facilitate its accomplishment of this broad purpose. The next chapter is devoted to an explanation of that part of the Panel's proposals.

III. The Information and Cultural Affairs Agency

In recommending an organizational revision of USIA/CU programs, the Panel acts from a conviction that the structure in Washington is inappropriate to the successful conduct of today's cultural diplomacy. To seize actively the opportunities of our time will require many changes, some of which have already been mentioned, that go beyond form and structure. But the majority opinion of witnesses appearing before the Panel has been that the information and cultural program operates today under organizational handicaps which should be corrected in order to permit the deeper changes of content and purpose all desire. In this chapter, therefore, we shall attempt: first, to spell out in broad terms what those changes should be and the basic requirements that the new agency should satisfy; and second, to define the structure, authority, and functions of the proposed Information and Cultural Affairs Agency (ICA).

General Requirements for the ICA

Former USIA Director George Allen once said that only the U.S. Government could invent a system under which one agency sends the fiddler abroad and another the fiddle. He was referring to the separation between the exchange of persons function in CU and the general information function in USIA, a division between people and media that was originally instituted to prevent the "contamination" of educational exchange by "propaganda" (see Chapter I). The separation never made much sense, since both programs were executed in the field by the same agency, and educational and cultural exchange remained subject to political currents flowing through the Department of State. Today, with the world far different from twenty years ago, the separation makes even less sense and is indeed harmful to the most effective forms of multimedia effort. Under

current arrangements, people included in such programs must be recruited as Short Term American Grantees (STAGS) by CU, while the media must be assembled from a variety of separately-funded media offices in USIA. Coordination is often cumbersome within USIA; but between USIA and CU the task is far more difficult, demanding excellent working relations between corresponding officials and a tremendous commitment of time and energy to coordination efforts.

General Information and Exchange of Persons Combined

A fundamental reason for combining the general information and exchange of persons functions is to end this inefficient separation of people and media. By doing so the Washington offices serving overseas posts would be brought into correspondence with the unified organization which has worked so effectively in the field for over twenty years. It would simplify enormously the task of those stationed abroad in their efforts to get from headquarters the support they need to do their jobs. A combined general information and exchange of persons program would mean, for the new ICA, one instead of two channels of communication with the field, one instead of two personnel and administrative structures, and one supervisor instead of two for the officers who now try to satisfy CU and USIA. For the government and public interest, it would mean a single line of responsibility and policy control, instead of the confusing pattern that now exists, plus some budgetary savings from the ending of duplication of offices. From all management precepts, fusion of two virtually identical functions in the same structure makes eminent organizational sense.

If the desirability of combining the two functions is accepted, the next question is obviously that of how and where the new combination should be made. Here a number of substantive and organizational factors come into play. First, the new agency must be established with a unique and finely-tuned relationship to American foreign policy and the bureaucracy that formulates and executes it. For years the question of the relationship between cultural diplomacy and foreign policy has been dominated by arguments between those, on the one hand, who insist that a program without explicit foreign policy objectives has no public purpose and therefore no claim on government resources, and those, on the other hand, who demand that cultural diplomacy—and especially the exchange of persons program—must remain completely free of any contamination by the political forces which control foreign policy. The Panel believes that both arguments raise points that are essentially valid and that neither, therefore, can be wholly accepted to the exclusion of the other. A middle ground can and should be found.

There is no question that, if it is to have any posibility for acceptance (and therefore effectiveness) abroad, the combined general information and exchange of persons program and the agency which runs it must maintain a certain distance from the foreign policy process. This is partially due to the need for credibility described in Chapter II, to enhance the image of objectivity these information and cultural programs must project. Then, too, the objectives of this program must be achieved not solely in the foreign policy apparatus of other countries but, above all, in the larger context of foreign societies. In both respects, the ability of officers to cultivate a climate of opinion abroad sympathetic to American policies and ideas assumes a kind of independence that would be facilitated by their detachment from the day-to-day formulation and conduct of American foreign policy.

This is not, however, to imply that the new combined program should be entirely released from the long range objectives of U.S. foreign policy. On the contrary, the Panel accepts unreservedly the proposition that cultural diplomacy must be in harmony with these objectives. While the independence and impartiality of each element of this program must be assured, it is up to the policy organs of government to specify where its emphasis should lie. In what areas is misunderstanding greatest? In which fields and at what institutions is it most desirable to encourage the formation of groups that can facilitate international cooperation? Thus the Agency might be directed to encourage scientific exchanges with one part of the world, but to focus on exchanges of literature and art in another.

In sum, then, the new Information and Cultural Affairs Agency would require a rather delicate but wholly feasible relationship with the Department of State. It must be close enough to policy makers to respond to long-range policy needs and the national interest without being so close that it is subject to pressures of diplomatic crises or political expediency. The distinction drawn here is admittedly a fine one; failure to draw it, however, leaves only the alternatives of a program that is irrelevant to the national interest in foreign policy and unworthy of government support, or one consisting of a blatant propaganda and politicized culture which has almost no chance of effectiveness.

Association with Private Sector

This kind of relationship to foreign policy and its practitioners is also indicated by two other important considerations. First is the evident need of this new program for the closest possible association with the private sector at home and abroad. At home the program must draw on that sector for its resources, both human and material. It is obvious that American exchange grantees come from the private

sector, and that grantees from abroad are received by the private sector in the United States. In addition, the "mutual" aspect of the program demands the closest relationships with individuals, businesses, foundations, and other groups outside of government who will profit by exposure to foreign ideas and culture. What is less obvious is that often the most successful media products are those acquired from private sources, real examples of life in the United States which have an authenticity that no government-packaged product can attain. Overseas, the new information and cultural program needs the private sector to help it disseminate information about the United States, especially in the growing number of countries where the profusion of local media makes it difficult for any foreign operation to gain an audience. Instead of fruitlessly competing for attention with local media, the new program will need to put increasing effort into working with them to improve the objectivity and scope of their coverage of the United States. These tasks can be performed only by an agency with a certain detachment from those responsible for day-to-day policy formulation and implementation.

Finally, the new program will require a good deal of operational flexibility and sheer capacity. Cultural diplomacy is an active diplomacy, and the organization that administers it must be able to field imaginative and persuasive programs. The range of tools in its inventory runs the gamut from personal contact to videotape technology and from academic exchange to art displays and library management. The professional use of these techniques alone requires an operational capability quite different from that involved in the formation and execution of foreign policy. Indeed, several witnesses have told the Panel that the State Department is not organized to run such a program and that integration into the Department would render its effective management impossible. Again, the evidence points to a separate organization, related by lines of general policy to the State Department, but clearly separate and autonomous in its daily operations.

Defining the ICA

The Panel considered several alternative locations for the new Information and Cultural Affairs Agency. The two extremes of complete integration with the Department or of virtual independence from government control (on the model of the National Endowments) were soon rejected since neither would achieve the kind of relationship with U.S. foreign policy already set forth as a basic requirement for the new agency—the former would be too close to and the latter too far removed from the Department of State. Several Panel members were strongly attracted to the possibilities presented by a complete reorganization of the State Department into an overall

Department of Foreign Affairs (on the Defense Department model), headed by a super secretary, under whom the ICA could be established with a director of secretarial rank. This possibility, however, was also set aside, for it demands changes far beyond the Panel's competence even to investigate, let alone recommend. The Panel thus centered its deliberations on two remaining possibilities for the ICA. The first would establish it as an independent agency with status similar to USIA today. The second would include it as an autonomous element under the Department of State, headed by its own Director, a model approximated by the arrangements under which the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) now function, but reflecting the special needs of an international information and cultural program.

To a certain extent, the Panel believes, the differences between these two locations are more cosmetic than substantive; the ICA could probably perform adequately in either place. This conclusion is supported by the fact that when the foreign aid program was transferred from a status parallel to the present USIA to the one it now occupies there were hardly any substantive or administrative changes. Indeed, the Administrator of AID and the Director of ACDA, both of whom report to the Secretary of State, outrank in protocol the USIA and CIA Directors, who report directly to the President. Thus, the functional and organizational considerations which follow could apply equally to an independent agency and to one under the State Department umbrella.

Location Under But Not In State

Nevertheless, the Panel has come to feel that the location under the State Department is preferable. First of all, the simplest organizational logic points to a consolidation of foreign affairs programs under the department charged with overall coordination of these programs. Then, if State were reorganized into a Department of Foreign Affairs, the combined information and cultural program would already be there—well positioned for inclusion in the new arrangement. Second, the Panel believes that being under the Department umbrella the ICA might find more ready acceptance by Congress and the American people, since its importance to American foreign policy—always difficult to prove—would be personally defined and defended by the Secretary of State. Third, with the private sector as well, a State label might help the new organization in its effort to recruit top-notch talent who find State Department auspices familiar and prestigious. Fourth, attachment to the State Department will help assure that the conduct of the information and cultural program is in long-range support of official U.S. foreign

policy. Fifth, positioning this program within the organizational structure of the Department will impress upon the career officers of State the importance of cultural diplomacy and familiarize them with its conduct.

For all these reasons, the Panel has concluded that the information and cultural program would find its optimal location under—but not in—the Department of State, as an autonomous agency with its own budget and administration.

Many of the activities of USIA and all activities of CU would be transferred to ICA, but several present USIA programs would be performed elsewhere. In the first place, the new agency would obviously not include those USIA activities which relate to the policy information function, such as the Policy Guidance Staff (IOP), the Wireless File (IPS), and probably other activities. Nor would it have need of those which support USIA's advisory function, namely, the Media Reaction Unit (IOP) and certain of the research functions (of IOR) that deal with the analysis of public opinion abroad. (See Chapter IV.) The VOA would also not be included. (Because of its multipurpose role, the Panel has decided that VOA requires separate treatment in Chapter V.) The new reliance on the private sector for program resources would mean that certain segments of the media production by Washington-based support units of USIA could be reduced. Positions associated with Washington-based production of feature motion pictures and motion picture and TV series could be curtailed. On the other hand, staffs and capabilities devoted to private media product acquisition should be strengthened. For the occasionally required documentary production, contract arrangements would be relied upon as much as possible. USIA's videotape program, as contrasted to its TV production operations, should be maintained.

The Agency's formerly wide-ranging publications effort has already been substantially reduced. While further selective curtailment should be sought, in-house publications such as *Amerika Illustrated* for the Soviet Union (and perhaps also for Poland), *Dialogue*, and the more recently devised *Economic Impact* continue to have a place in America's cultural effort and should be transferred to the new agency. The validity of retaining a number of regional and single-country periodicals requires critical restudy. Substantial further publication curtailment will also bring into question the need for retaining the three Regional Service Center printing plants in Manila, Beirut, and Mexico City, though a more detailed reassessment of their utility and workload must precede final decision.

Priority Tasks of ICA

The USIA and CU programs absorbed by the new Information

and Cultural Affairs Agency should be rechanneled into the following priority tasks:

First, the new agency would continue and greatly expand both educational and leadership exchange of persons.

Second, it would continue and, where appropriate, expand its cultural presentations.

Third, it would conduct a coordinated and enlarged media acquisitions program. In the motion picture-TV field, this effort would largely replace the in-house production recommended above for curtailment.

Fourth, it should continue those activities of USIA's Press and Publications Service (IPS) which remain after the removal of the Wireless File and the curtailment of publications (and the probable resultant cut-back in Regional Service Center operations).

Fifth, it would undertake the activities now performed by USIA's Information Center Service (ICS). These include, primarily, the support and servicing of the overseas libraries; the planning and mounting of multi-media programming, which would become the guiding format for much of the Agency's overseas effort; support of the teaching of English as a foreign language; exhibits abroad, which, incidentally, draw heavily on acquired materials; and related activities, including the book translation program.

The ICA might also absorb some of the work now carried on by other government departments in areas related to the exchange of persons and the portrayal of American society overseas. Moreover, ICA ought to assume a Presidentially-directed coordination responsibility for all overseas information and cultural programs, since the large operations now run by the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, National Science Foundation and others—whatever the various particular goals they may serve—have in common an impact on U.S. foreign policy.

Organizationally, the Panel believes that the ICA should provide for the complete integration of the activities formerly separated between USIA and CU. If people and media are to be employed together around subjects, then categories of substantive program content should provide the criterion for organizing the new agency, backed by the necessary administrative and operations expertise to make the programs effective abroad. To better provide this backup, the present USIA and CU area offices might well be merged, and consideration should be given to combining all USIA media offices (except VOA) with the Cultural Presentations Office of CU into an Office of Field Services. Finally, an administrative office separate from the State Department should be established in order to retain operational flexibility and management control.

The Board of Foreign Scholarships would continue in existence to

ensure that, within the overall strategies agreed on by the new agency, individual academic grantees would be selected purely on the basis of academic excellence and without regard to political considerations.

The Panel recommends that the two Advisory Commissions be discontinued. In their stead, Congress should create an Advisory Commission on International Information and Cultural Affairs composed of seven members broadly representative of the U.S. cultural, educational, and information fields. Members should be appointed by the President with approval by the Senate. The Commission should meet at least once each month.

In order for the Advisory Commission to function effectively, it should be independent of the Agency, reporting at least annually to the President and the Congress. The Commission should be adequately funded to provide for personnel, travel, and other services necessary to fulfill its mission.

Abroad, the work of the new agency should in most cases continue to be designated by organizational titles presently used, including USIS. (Not all USIA establishments overseas use the USIS designation because in several languages the word "information" connotes intelligence; hence, some posts call themselves Press and Cultural Service, while others use only the word "culture" in their designation.) There may be some objection to the continued use of the USIS designation now that policy information is no longer included and the stateside parent organization is more "culturally" oriented. Nonetheless, retention appears to be wise. The designation has been in use since Office of War Information and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs days, having withstood change as the parent agencies in Washington went through a long succession of alphabetical alterations. Except for the absence of the policy information role (see Chapter IV) these missions will still be performing a majority of the functions they have undertaken over the last 20 and more years. Their nature has come to be known and accepted by foreign audiences under that name, and host country users are therefore more likely to be confused than enlightened by a terminology change. It would be unfortunate if semantic arguments should result in the U.S. Government's sacrifice of a valuable, instantly recognizable label abroad. However, the director of the reshaped USIS mission should change his title from that of PAO (an untranslatable title in any case) to the more accurate and meaningful Information-Cultural Counselor/Attaché. (ICA's missions overseas will continue to be staffed mostly by USIA's Foreign Service Information Officers (FSIOs) who, in the Panel's view, should become State Department Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), see Chapter VI.)

The Panel believes that the agency outlined above would provide a

sympathetic and effective organizational home for a concerted governmental effort to meet the objectives outlined for the new cultural diplomacy in Chapter II. How the ICA might be created is discussed in Chapter VI. First, however, there are two additional areas of USIA which remain to be discussed: the Voice of America, and the Agency's advisory and policy information roles. The next chapter deals with the latter functions.

IV. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy Information

One of the anomalies of the present structure of United States foreign information and cultural operations is that while our foreign policy is formulated by the Department of State under the President, it is articulated abroad by an independent agency (the USIA) outside the Department. This arrangement is unique with the United States Government; no other major government has it.

A second anomaly is that the independent agency is expected to advise the Department of State on the probable foreign opinion aspects of our foreign policy decisions and keep the Department informed on public reactions to such decisions, although these functions are actually being performed by the Department itself.

It is the considered opinion of the Panel that these anomalies can be eliminated by placing the articulation of our foreign policy in the hands of the Department most responsible for formulating and executing that policy. Similarly, the rendering of advice to decision makers on foreign public opinion as an input to the policy making process can, in the Panel's view, be accomplished only by people who have regular access to those decision makers in the Department of State. Therefore, although the Panel acknowledges that the present system has worked surprisingly well despite its awkward structure, it believes it will work much better when both the articulation and defense of foreign policy and advice on public opinion relevant to its formulation are closely tied to the makers and implementers of that policy both in Washington and abroad.

As for the operation overseas, the Panel recommends that these functions be carried out by FSIOs (to become FSOs) as Press Counselors/Attachés in large and medium-sized embassies and by designated embassy officers in small embassies.

Washington Organization and Operations

To accomplish these objectives, the Panel proposes the establishment in the Department of State of an Office of Policy Information, headed by a Deputy Under Secretary of State, who would be the highest Department official below the Secretary in the area of explanation and articulation of U.S. foreign policy. He would have to be a member of the Secretary's "inner circle" in order not only to obtain from him the necessary knowledge for the proper performance of his role in the field of public diplomacy but also to offer advice to the Secretary on public opinion factors that may affect policy decisions while these are still under discussion.

Below the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Information and reporting to him would be an Assistant Secretary of State for International Press Relations and the present Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. Also reporting to him would be the Department's press spokesman who would, however, have direct ties to the Secretary. The Deputy Under Secretary and the press spokesman should see the Secretary together at least once every day, the former to gain the information he needs for the performance of his overall functions, the latter for the material he requires for his daily meetings with the press.

The Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Information would give guidance to the two Assistant Secretaries and to the press spokesman when the latter did not receive instructions directly from the Secretary. He would, on behalf of the Secretary, give the Director of ICA general advice on the long-range policy goals which the Agency should support. In addition, he would be a statutory member of the VOA Board of Overseers (see Chapter V).

The present responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and of the press spokesman would remain unchanged.

The responsibilities of the new Assistant Secretary of State for International Press Relations would in the main fall into the following four areas:

1. Wireless File—This bureau would send to the United States Embassies in general and to Press Counselors/Attachés in particular a daily wireless report, including such items as the texts of statements or speeches by government officials relating to foreign policy issues, the text or excerpts of the daily briefing by the Department's spokesman, interpretative commentaries, and other policy-oriented material. USIA personnel now employed in preparing the Wireless File would need to be transferred to the new bureau for this purpose. It is hoped that the new and modern communications facilities in the Department can be used for the transmission of this report, in lieu of the comparatively outdated USIA Wireless File system.

2. Policy Guidance—This bureau would provide the Press Counselors/Attachés at all times with background and guidance material and the new Information and Cultural Affairs Agency, as well as VOA, with current information and advice on foreign policy developments.

3. VOA Policy Access—Some Worldwide English writers now employed by VOA would be transferred to the Bureau to prepare policy interpretations on issues of major current foreign policy interest, for use by the VOA as official positions of the United States Government. (See Chapter V.) These could also be used in the daily wireless report.

By folding the above policy information functions into the Department of State, articulation and explanation of foreign policy for overseas audiences should not only become more direct but, above all, more authoritative.

4. Advisory—The Assistant Secretary's Bureau would prepare daily analyses and digests of reporting telegrams from Press Counselors/Attachés on relevant reactions of public opinion, supplemented by material obtained from the public affairs advisors in the Department's geographic and functional bureaus. These analyses would be given to the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Information so that he can advise the Secretary of State on public opinion factors that may affect prospective policy decisions.

One reason the USIA has had difficulty carrying out the task, assigned by President Kennedy in 1963, of advising the executive branch "on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies" has clearly been the lack of regular access to the makers of foreign policy. The proposed folding of the advisory function into the Department of State at the Deputy Under Secretary level would, in the Panel's view, correct this anomaly.

Overseas Organization and Operations

The official abroad principally concerned with carrying out the policy information and advisory functions should be the Press Counselor/Attaché. In countries with well-developed media, this task may require the full-time attention of a senior officer of counselor rank, assisted by one or two middlegrade officers. These officers should be prepared to speak for their ambassador or to arrange and backstop his meetings and interviews with media correspondents. In most medium-sized missions, a single officer should suffice. In small embassies, a member of the political section could be assigned the press attaché role as a collateral duty.

The Press Counselor/Attaché would be the primary recipient of the Wireless File and of policy information guidance and background telegrams from the Department. These would be the main,

though not the sole, material for his daily work to articulate and explain U.S. foreign policy. Conversely, he would report to the Department relevant press and other media reaction to U.S. policies, as well as other factors regarding the state of public opinion in the country where he serves.

The skills required of a topnotch Press Counselor/Attaché are allied to those demanded of a successful political officer. There is a close relationship between and among political reporting, policy articulation, and reaction assessment. Press Counselor/Attaché assignments should contribute to the career development of political officers by improving their effectiveness in verbal communications, even as political officer assignments will impose on officers with a USIA background the discipline of succinct reporting.

A high degree of tact and managerial skill will be required of Press Counselor/Attachés in dovetailing their policy information operations with the general information activities of the Information-Cultural Counselor/Attaché heading the local USIS establishment of the Information and Cultural Affairs Agency. The standard kind of USIS familiarization of foreign audiences with American life and institutions through seminars, articles, lectures, films, and radio/TV programs will occasionally intersect with policy information, when general current concerns—energy, pollution, recession, etc.—are dealt with.

Smooth operation of the programs will therefore require both that the Press Counselor/Attaché be intimately familiar with the USIS program, and that the Information-Cultural Counselor/Attaché take cognizance of the Press Counselor/Attaché's work with bilateral or locally-significant policy issues. There will be some overlap in the cultivation of contacts in the media sector—overlap in contact cultivation occurs frequently among embassy elements—but "clients" will eventually become aware of the fact that general information products and the exchange of persons program is handled by USIS, while information on current policy issues is provided by the Press Counselor/Attaché. Close cooperation between the two officers will ensure that host country media contacts are serviced properly, whether or not they respect, or are even aware of, our internal delineation between policy information and general information. To this end the two officers will also need to share their headquarters' policy guidance.

The proposed new arrangement eliminates the present echelon and position of Public Affairs Officer (PAO) as an intermediate level between the operating press and information-cultural elements and the embassy's top management. The DCM himself will henceforth be exercising this coordinating and supervisory role on behalf of the ambassador, as he does for the other staff sections of the embassy.

V. Voice of America

THE Voice of America, born during the Second World War, is now over thirty years old. It broadcasts in English and thirty-four foreign languages. To do so, it maintains a staff of over two thousand, and operates over a hundred major and minor shortwave transmitting facilities in the United States and overseas. It is an integral part of the United States international information and cultural effort, and the question of its future has been a primary concern of the Panel's study.

Necessity for VOA

The first issues that must be faced are whether the VOA is still necessary and, if so, whether it will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.

As already noted in Chapter II, we live in a far different environment from that prevalent during the 1940's and 1950's. The communications explosion has saturated the world with information, making shortwave receptivity in developed areas a difficult task. In the developing world, indigenous media are beginning to take hold, while the atmosphere of detente in East-West relations requires us to ask whether international radio broadcasting is still needed to reach the peoples of East Europe and the Soviet Union. At the same time, the costs of shortwave broadcasting are increasing dramatically as U.S. competitors move rapidly into new generations of more powerful transmitters. In this intensely competitive atmosphere, it is especially important to test carefully the reasons why the U.S. Government should continue to compete in the international shortwave field.

The rapid buildup in other nations' capabilities is in itself a persuasive argument for a continued American effort. The willingness

of other governments (with GNPs far smaller than that of the United States) to invest substantially in international broadcasting creates, at the least, a presumption that the activity is worthwhile. In addition, it might perhaps be argued that as leader of the West the United States cannot afford to be behind in any important competitive area. Nevertheless, the fact that others do something does not justify our doing it. We must consider additional reasons for the VOA.

Upon closer examination, the premises enumerated above of those who doubt the VOA's usefulness do not hold up under careful analysis. The communications explosion, for example, is not a worldwide phenomenon, and it creates opportunities as well as obstacles for shortwave broadcasting. The spread of "transistors" capable of shortwave reception in the Third World has far outdistanced the development of indigenous media to supply them, creating great opportunities for the United States. Moreover, the communications explosion has little effect in so-called "denied areas" of the world, where, for political reasons, governments attempt to control the information environment in which their peoples live. Evidence to date indicates that the decision of the Soviet Government to reduce the level of confrontation with the West bears no relation to its domestic policies and has not changed the Communist attitude toward the free flow of information. In spite of detente, there remain many areas of the world of great political importance to the United States—China, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and a score of developing countries—to which radio is our only means of daily communication.

Opposed to the arguments against the Voice, one should place the positive strengths of shortwave radio which argue eloquently in its favor. Though at first glance it may seem to be just another information tool, international shortwave broadcasting has special characteristics which make it useful for a variety of purposes but (as a result) extremely difficult to classify in a functional and organizational sense. First is the immediacy of radio, the ability to communicate worldwide in seconds. This round-the-clock capability makes the Voice a particularly valuable tool in the policy information field, where time carries an importance totally unknown in cultural diplomacy. Second, the VOA has the unique ability to communicate directly, without prior authorization of the governments to whose people its signal is directed. Except for the expensive and only marginally effective practice of jamming, radio is an uncensorable medium, the only one available at the present state of communications technology. This characteristic also enhances the Voice's use as a policy information tool, especially with regard to those "denied" areas of the globe where the United States has major interests but is unable to communicate by most other means, due to host govern-

ment restrictions. The VOA capability for instantaneous, uncensored access to people all over the world might be critically important to the United States in time of crisis.

Yet the Voice does not restrict itself to information about U.S. foreign policy. To do so would be to turn it into a sort of Federal Register of the Air that could not begin to interest and hold an audience. The VOA must remain the Voice of America, not just of the U.S. Government, and a large part of its programming will continue to fall in the category of general information seeking to portray American society overseas. Nevertheless, as a medium for cultural diplomacy, the VOA faces particular difficulties, because it cannot divest itself of the policy information role. It is a medium which must combine policy and general information. Indeed, its need to handle *both* policy and general information is precisely the reason why it is difficult to classify the Voice.

Finally, the Voice possesses one other element which underscores its special character. In addition to policy and general information, the Voice discharges a third function: it broadcasts the news twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The Voice must carry the news because, in the first place, the retention of its audience in the highly competitive area of international broadcasting depends upon it. Without the news, just as without the music and feature stories included in general information, there would be no audience to receive policy information. Moreover, the kind of access to the news that Americans enjoy is vital to foreign appreciation of policy decisions made in the world's most "open" society. American foreign policy cannot be understood by those abroad unless they have available to them substantially the same picture of the world as is available to Americans.

In addition, the VOA should broadcast the news, and do so objectively, because the strength of America's ideological appeal depends in large measure upon our devotion to the free flow of information. Success with our adversaries in detente depends on our ability to portray the challenge and diversity of Western culture to their peoples, to break the monopoly of closed regimes on the news, and to substitute—not just the U.S. foreign policy position—but the whole panoply of reality in the outside world. This ability, in turn, rests upon the capacity to reach an audience in the local language with a clear signal at the right time of the day—a capacity which VOA regrettably lacks in certain important areas because of transmitter problems (age, power, location, numbers).

Mission of VOA

The VOA thus has three missions: to broadcast news, to portray American society, and to deliver the policy of the U.S. Government.

These three objectives are clearly identified in the operating directive endorsed by the Panel under which VOA has now functioned for over 15 years, as follows:

1. VOA will establish itself as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.
2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society. It will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.
3. As an official radio, VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively. VOA will also present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies.

The difficulty which the Panel has had to face is that, logically, these three missions call for three different organizational locations, a problem which has plagued VOA throughout its postwar history. As a policy information medium, the Voice should clearly be placed, with other policy-related activities, under the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy Information (see Chapter IV). As a general information medium, VOA would seem to belong with the Information and Cultural Affairs Agency (see Chapter III). And as a broadcaster of the news, the necessity of freedom from government control dictates an independent status as isolated as possible from political influences.

Since it is impractical to divide the Voice or to have it located in three places at once, the problem is obviously to choose the functional location which does least violence to the performance of the other two functions. To argue negatively for a moment, the Panel is convinced that placing VOA in either the Information and Cultural Affairs Agency or the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy Information would severely compromise its independence as a source of news. Moreover, control by either body would make it extremely difficult for the Voice to carry out the function entrusted to the other body. For example, a VOA located within the Deputy Under Secretary's office might be tempted to stifle broadcast of "cultural" features that seemed to compromise day-to-day foreign policy. By the same token, the Voice in a politically insulated Information and Cultural Affairs Agency might compromise the intended cultural thrust of the Agency. A location outside either of these bodies would avoid such problems, so long as the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy Information and the Director of the ICA had a regular opportunity to make the Department's and Agency's views known.

Location of VOA

What is required, then, is a position outside both the ICA and the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State but closely linked to

each for programming purposes. The nature of the linkage would, of course, be different for the two kinds of information. The same reasons that argue for the closest connection of policy information to the political operations of the Department of State (see Chapter IV) are undiminished--even strengthened—by the characteristics of radio communication. Hence, the VOA should provide direct and unqualified access to broadcast time for spokesmen in the State Department's Office of Policy Information and the *State Department itself should be directly responsible for explaining and articulating U.S. foreign policy over the Voice*, thus eliminating the perennial question of whether or not VOA faithfully carries out State Department policy. The looser relationship between cultural diplomacy and foreign policy (defined in Chapter III) means that guidance from ICA would be adequate to keep VOA's portrayal of American society in tune with long-range policy objectives. Copy in this area, including commentaries and analyses, could be written by the same professionals who would handle the VOA news coverage.

A VOA with these links to policy and general information should be supervised by a board of overseers reflecting its mixed functions. *The board's overall responsibility would be to ensure that the Voice operates in support of U.S. national objectives* and to establish policy in areas where the requirements of its differing functions may conflict.

The Panel is aware that a Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) is in existence, created by law as responsible for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and composed of five members. Inasmuch as VOA and RFE/RL are publicly-funded radios and depend on shortwave facilities for their broadcasting, joint oversight for all three would seem logical, and the Panel seriously considered placing VOA under BIB control for organizational simplicity. At the same time, VOA and RFE/RL have completely different missions: the first is the official voice of the people and government of the United States with a worldwide audience, while the latter two operate as private corporations, funded by U.S. Government grants, broadcasting local (e.g., Polish or Hungarian) news into the target areas in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Hence, the successful programming of VOA requires total editorial separation from RFE/RL.

The Panel weighed carefully not only technical and editorial considerations but also the political implications of joint oversight and has concluded that at this time the VOA should be placed under a separate Board of Overseers. At some future date, the Congress and the Administration may find it desirable to merge the two Boards.

Composition of VOA Board

The new VOA Board should be composed of five members, two of whom should be the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy

Information and the Director of the new ICA. The other three members, one of whom should be chairman, should be appointed from the private sector by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They should be of national stature and have both experience in diplomacy and some familiarity with the field of international communications. Finally, there would be an Executive Director who would act as the Board's full-time representative. He and his staff would carry out the Board's policy control and evaluation tasks.

Under the new arrangements, the VOA itself would be maintained virtually intact as a federal agency. Its Director would be appointed by unanimous vote of the Board and serve at its pleasure, a majority vote being sufficient for removal. The basic organization of VOA staff should remain more or less along current lines and the offices and studios would be maintained. A few administrative personnel now within USIA and assigned wholly to Voice activities would be placed directly in VOA's already existing administrative apparatus. The radio section of the Media Research Division of USIA should be transferred to VOA and established as an Audience Research Section. The assignment to key Voice positions of foreign service officers who have served extensively in the areas to which their sectors of VOA are regularly broadcasting should be continued for regular tours of duty. There should be an expression in writing by the Secretary of State assuring the Board and the appointed VOA Director of the possibility, indeed the desirability, of such assignments, accompanied by a statement that such assignments, if successfully completed, would be considered a positive factor in the individual officer's career.

The Panel believes that these arrangements would permit the VOA to function as a credible medium, serving the interests of the U.S. Government in both the policy and general information fields. As such, the Voice would form a valuable complement to the Information and Cultural Affairs Agency and the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy Information in the new structure of American public diplomacy set forth in earlier chapters of this report.

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VI. Recommendations for Implementation

In previous chapters the Panel has elaborated in some detail its recommendations for reorganization of American programs in the field of international information, education, and cultural relations. In the process we have attempted to explain the reasons why such reorganization seems logical and desirable, beginning with the challenges faced by cultural diplomacy in the 1970's, and continuing with the characteristics we consider essential for any government structure seeking to meet them. The tasks remaining, then, are only two: first, to review our recommendations in order to lay out both the relationship between them and the total governmental structure that will result; and second, to explain what practical actions are necessary for our plan to be put into effect.

An Outline for the Future

In Chapter I we described four functions that the Panel has used to categorize the many activities of USIA and CU; these functions formed the foundation for the discussions in subsequent chapters. Our initial distinction was between the policy information and advisory functions, on the one hand, and general information plus the exchange of persons, on the other. The first two functions, it was submitted, simply could not be performed without the closest relationship to the people who actually formulate American foreign policy. In the absence of any convincing arguments against that association, it was concluded that the two functions should be fully integrated into the existing structure of the Department of State, the institutional repository of the policy making process. In particular, we recommended (in Chapter IV) that they should be the responsibility of a new State Department Office of Policy Information. This office would disseminate information about U.S. foreign policy over-

seas and advise the Secretary as to the state of public opinion worldwide.

By contrast, the second two functions, though needed to support foreign policy, could, in the Panel's view, quite adequately be performed without involvement in the political vicissitudes of day-to-day policy problems. Indeed, due to their need for a close relationship to the private sector, a position somewhat detached from the daily administration of foreign policy seemed desirable. However, it was also found necessary to ensure that their programming would be directed to the service of long-range foreign policy goals. The similarity of the general information and exchange of persons functions in this delicate relationship to foreign policy, plus the unanimous assertion by practitioners of public diplomacy that people and media must be programmed together overseas, led to the conclusion that the two should be combined in an autonomous organization within the Department of State. We recommended the establishment of such an Information and Cultural Affairs Agency in Chapter III.

Finally, the Voice of America, though heavily involved in both policy and general information, was found to be a special case because of its third function as a news disseminator. It was therefore decided that it would fit neither in the regular policy structure of the Department nor in the newly established ICA. It was accordingly recommended (in Chapter V) that it be organized as a separate agency under a presidentially-appointed Board of Directors.

A three-part organizational solution has thus emerged: policy information and advice would be folded into the Department of State, general information and exchange of persons would be integrated in the ICA, and the VOA would be established independently of each and responsible only to its Board. The three organizations would interrelate, but in rather different ways. The most direct connection would be between the VOA and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy Information, who would sit on the Voice Board of Directors and whose office would furnish directly the foreign policy statements to be aired on the radio. The Director of the ICA would also sit on the VOA Board, but the Agency's relationship to the Voice would only be that of providing general advice for the VOA cultural output. The ICA, as its autonomous status indicates, would likewise receive only general advice from the Secretary and the Deputy Under Secretary on the long-range policy goals that the information and cultural program should support. The Office of Policy Information would be almost completely independent of the other two, drawing its sustenance from its intimate involvement in the foreign policy process as conducted at the highest levels of the Department.

Overseas, the present triad of PAO-IO-CAO would be replaced by a Press Counselor/Attaché (reporting to the Department of State)

and an Information-Cultural Counselor/Attaché (reporting to the ICA). Both the Department and the Agency would thus have their own officers in the field to execute their respective programs, instead of the current pattern, whereby CU programs are executed by USIA officers. The Press and Information-Cultural Counselors/Attachés would work closely together, maintaining the pattern of teamwork that has so effectively interrelated the policy and general information programs in the past.

Getting from Here to There

The Panel does not anticipate that implementation of its proposals will be a difficult undertaking or cause serious physical or personal dislocations. While we believe that the recommended changes are important and will result in a more efficient program, nearly all personnel (including local employees) currently involved in overseas information and cultural programs would retain the functions they perform now. The VOA will remain virtually intact under its new Board, inheriting only a few USIA administrative officers already accustomed to handling Voice affairs. The Bureau of International Press Relations in the State Department Office of Policy Information would consist of USIA personnel who had already been concerned with day-to-day policy guidance, as well as those State Department officers who had already been providing policy guidance to USIA. Establishment of the ICA would make it possible to combine the geographical area offices in USIA and CU, enabling personnel with similar concerns to work together more closely.

Though the problems of conversion should not be great, establishment of the new organizational structure will require action in at least three areas: personnel, legislation, and budget. If those in authority decide to act on this report, it is strongly recommended that small groups of specialists from within the government be assigned to explore the actions necessary in each of these areas and to outline procedures that will ensure a smooth transition. Suggestions in the following paragraphs are intended to illustrate the kinds of action that may be necessary.

In the personnel area, the issue arises as to the classification of those who move into the State Department's Office of Policy Information, to the ICA, or to the new VOA. At present, USIA and CU are staffed with individuals from a variety of personnel classification categories. Many are FSIOs, but FSO, General Schedule (GS), Wage Board (WB), and several other systems are represented. There is no need to alter the category of any personnel other than FSIOs. With the termination of USIA as it has existed for the past 21 years, the retention of the FSIO corps apart from the FSO service seems anachro-

nistic. Therefore, the Panel believes that USIA's FSIO career service should be absorbed into State's FSO corps.

Indeed, such an integration would be an important step in the direction of developing Foreign Service Officers who have well-honed skills not only in the political and economic but also in the press and information-cultural areas. There ought to be increasing interchange, with present FSOs serving in the future in press and information-cultural positions and present FSIOs being assigned to political and other areas.

Those officers presently in USIA and CU who are not involved in the diplomatic aspect of the new agencies should be classified as GS and become part of the regular classified civil service. This would give these agencies maximum flexibility in the recruiting, hiring, and promotion of those serving with the new agencies as specialists or in administrative and clerical positions. The program to induce Civil Service Officers in USIA and CU to convert to domestic Foreign Service Reserve appointment should be discontinued.

There should, of course, be the possibility for domestic civil service employees, and, indeed, others from the private sector, to enter the Foreign Service of the ICA for a limited tour of duty and thereafter return to their previous status. Such authority, however, should not be abused and only be employed in case of actual overseas assignments.

Turning from personnel questions to matters of authorization and funding, the Panel sees little need to expand current legal authorities beyond those provided USIA (including VOA) and CU in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 and the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. However, because of the lapse of the President's reorganization authority under which USIA was created (see Chapter I), Congressional action will be needed to terminate USIA and establish the revised entities. In particular, the VOA, now simply an office of USIA, would have to be established as a government agency in its own right, and legislation will have to be enacted to create a VOA Board. The ICA, for its part, would require legislation establishing it as a new federal agency and transferring to it the appropriate functions now exercised by USIA and CU. Though the State Department could create the new Office of Policy Information (and abolish CU) by an internal reorganization, it would require Congressional agreement to create the additional Executive Level position to head it (Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Information—the Assistant Secretary for International Press Relations could take the vacancy created by the abolition of the job of Assistant Secretary for CU). Finally, the transfer of the FSIO to the FSO corps and the substitution of the present two Advisory Commissions by one new Advisory Commission will require legislative action.

On the budget side, reorganization of the CU and USIA appropriation structures will be required. First, it will be necessary to transfer from the USIA Salaries and Expenses appropriation to the similar appropriation of the State Department a sum sufficient to fund the cost of FSIOs transferring to the proposed Office of Policy Information, the Wireless File, and related activities that must accompany them. Second, steps must be taken to consolidate the appropriation that funds CU with that portion of the USIA Salaries and Expenses appropriation necessary to cover the elements of USIA which will be combining with CU to form the new ICA. A new appropriation should be established, using former USIA and CU funds as the base. The current USIA Special International Exhibition Account (SIE) would also go to the new Agency. Finally, that portion of the USIA Salaries and Expenses appropriation which now finances VOA should be included in a new VOA Salaries and Expenses appropriation to the VOA Board. A similar transfer of the Acquisition and Construction of Radio Facilities Account would also be necessary.

VII. Conclusions

In offering this report, the Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations wishes to emphasize the scope of the task it has undertaken. We recognized from the start that we were analyzing programs that have been of enormous benefit to our country over the course of a quarter century or more, activities which we believe have more than justified the resources and attention devoted to them.

The Panel thus did not set out to alter radically American programs in the field of public diplomacy. It set out, instead, to improve the government's capacity to carry them forward in the present and, if possible, in the developing international environment of the future. And, in the course of its investigations, the Panel found three major problems which nearly all witnesses agreed were hampering the execution of these programs now and were likely to cripple them in the future:

I. the division of one program between two agencies, USIA and the Department of State;

II. the assignment, to an agency separate from and independent of the State Department, of the task of interpreting U.S. foreign policy to the world and advising in its formulation; and

III. the ambiguous positioning of the Voice of America at the crossroads of journalism and diplomacy.

The Panel's recommendations endeavor to solve these problems primarily by combining presently fragmented programs:

I. by uniting the two agencies responsible for American information, education, and cultural relations;

II. by uniting all foreign policy information and advisory functions in the one Department where they can be properly executed; and

III. by establishing the VOA in a position worthy of its unique role and mission.

The Panel recognizes that the solutions to our problems require organizational changes, but organizational forms do not adapt themselves to new conditions unless initiatives are taken. USIA and CU have done admirably in circumstances very different from those for which they were designed. Their dedicated officials, however, have labored too long under needless structural burdens. It is time, in the Panel's view, to set them free.

Annex I

The United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

JULY 20, 1973.

Resolved: The Advisory Commission has been obligated by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 to examine those international educational and cultural exchange activities which fall within the purview of that Act.

Historically, two agencies have played a particularly significant role which brings them into relationship with each other—the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency. This has been a close and useful relationship. It has also involved a joint partnership which has occasioned certain problems and misunderstandings.

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Information has several times, in addressing itself to the Congress, suggested a reexamination of the proper distribution of functions performed by the U.S. Information Agency and the Department of State. In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its report dated May 27, 1973, has most recently expressed itself as inclined toward a redistribution of functions.

And, our own Advisory Commission has frequently questioned the arrangement of placing responsibility for carrying out the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs programs in the field through officers of the U.S. Information Agency.

We therefore, recognizing our responsibility, agree to devote a substantial portion of our time and energy during the coming months to a study of the similar and related functions performed by the U.S. Information Agency, its overseas information service, and the Department of State, with a view to recommending to the President, to the Congress, and to the agencies involved any rearrangements more suitable to the effective performance of these programs and more in keeping with the changing directions of U.S. foreign policy.

Acting Chairman Leo Cherne sent the following letter with a copy of the resolution to the officials listed below:

JULY 27, 1973.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: At the July 20, 1973 meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, the attached resolution was adopted. The sense of the resolution and the goal of the Commission is to study in depth the relationships between the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the United States Information Agency in today's rapidly changing world.

It is the desire of this Commission to work closely with all of those who are directly involved with the existing system. Either I or one of the other members of the Advisory Commission will of course be available to meet with you, should you wish it at this early stage, to discuss our proposed study.

With warm regards,

Respectfully,

LEO CHERNE,
Acting Chairman.

Enclosure: Resolution.

RECIPIENTS

President Richard Nixon
Secretary of State William P. Rogers
James I. Keogh, Director, USIA
Hobart Lewis, Chairman, Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Little Hoover Commission)
Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
Senator George D. Aiken, Committee on Foreign Relations
Congressman Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Congressman William S. Mailliard, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Congressman Wayne L. Hays, Chairman, Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Congressman Vernon W. Thompson, Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Roy L. Ash, Director, Office of Management and Budget
Lewis Olom, Staff Director, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information

The following is an excerpt from:

The 23rd Report
of the
United States Advisory Commission
on Information
February 1968

Twenty Years Later

It has been the continuing purpose of the Advisory Commission to report critically and constructively to Presidents and the Congress on the information, educational and cultural programs over which it was to keep watch. It has been our particular purpose in this report, twenty years after creation of those programs, to take a long step back from the trees and a searching look at the forest.

Yet we could not do all that we set out to do; too much lay beyond our resources. We did confirm that it ought to be done—a view not ours alone. The Sprague Committee[1], which

[1] *Officially, the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad, under the chairmanship of Mansfield D. Sprague. This was the last of three major overviews of the programs now administered by USIA. The first was conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1950–52 (the Fulbright-Hickenlooper hearings). The second was conducted by the President's Committee on International Information Activities—the Jackson Committee, chaired by William Jackson—in 1953. Additionally, USIA has come under consideration by the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements as part of a larger investigation concluded in 1967.*

conducted the last full-scale review devoted principally to USIA activities, concluded that "The Committee . . . believes that

more frequent independent reviews of the overall balance, interrelations and effectiveness of United States information activities is desirable, perhaps not less than once every three years." That was eight years ago.

It is our earnest recommendation that it be done now. Moreover, we urge that it be done not by an *ad hoc* committee of either legislative or executive origin, but under contract with an organization beyond the government. What should be sought is not only an in-depth critique of what USIA does well and what poorly, but of what it ought be doing and how best it might approach it.

We say it is time to examine assumptions.

Is the United States Information Agency to be but an agent of American "propaganda"? Should it be more than an arm of foreign policy? Are information, educational and cultural objectives compatible within one agency? Were they consolidated outside of the Department of State, should that body have Cabinet rank? Or should the reins be drawn together within a restructured Department of State[1]? Does the responsibility of

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[1] *The Brookings Institution, in a study ("The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy") released in 1960, offered the model for a reorganized Department of Foreign Affairs comprising three component departments, each with Cabinet rank: the Department of State, the Department of Foreign Economic Operations and the Department of Information and Cultural Affairs.*

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those who create the foreign policy of the United States go beyond its declaration? Should they have charge of its promulgation as well? Should USIA have a hand in information dispersal for Government agencies beyond the Department of State? Should it play a role in the influence of policy as well as in its execution? Should it help support those private organizations whose overseas activities had been subsidized covertly in the past by the federal government and whose future funding is under study by a committee chaired by the Secretary of State? Do we really intend that USIA work toward "*mutual* understanding"; is it to help us understand them as well as to help them understand us?

We presume to pose the questions, but not to propound their answers. Our earnest hope is that others will join in the seeking after them.

Finally, we call to the attention of Congress the reality that this Commission, like USIA, is itself 20 years after the fact. The incumbent members feel it timely to suggest that the Congress give similar overview to the role of this body in discharging Congressional intent, and to the question of whether, indeed, it has fulfilled its mission. We submit respectfully to that question.

The following is an excerpt from:

The 24th Report
of the
United States Advisory Commission
on Information
May 1969

AFTERWORD

We of the United States Advisory Commission on Information find ourselves one year older, but of no different mind, than we were at the conclusion of the 23d Report. It was then that we called for a major review of (1) the USIA and (2) the governmental context in which it operates. We said it was time to examine assumptions, and posed eleven questions that might be among those covered in such a study.* They are still worth asking:

Is the United States Information Agency to be but an agent of American "propaganda"?

Should it be more than an arm of foreign policy?

Are information, educational and cultural objectives compatible within one agency?

Were they consolidated outside of the Department of State, should that body have Cabinet rank?

Or should the reins be drawn together within a restructured Department of State?

Does the responsibility of those who create the foreign policy of the United States go beyond its declaration?

Should they have charge of its promulgation as well?

Should USIA have a hand in information dispersal for Government agencies beyond the Department of State?

Should it play a role in the influence of policy as well as in its execution?

Should it help support those private organizations whose overseas activities had been subsidized covertly in the past by the federal government and whose future funding is under study by a committee chaired by the Secretary of State?

Do we really intend that USIA work toward "mutual understanding"; is it to help us understand them as well as to help them understand us?

As we repeat the questions, so also do we repeat the hope that they will be answered.

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*A number of courses might be taken in pursuing the examination. One which commends itself to the Advisory Commission takes this form:

The President would appoint a Committee of Nine—one member each from the Senate, the House of Representatives, the National Security Council, the Department of State, the United States Information Agency and the United States Advisory Commission on Information, and, from the private sector, a chairman and two additional members knowledgeable in the fields of information, education and cultural affairs. This committee would select the study organization, review and approve the direction and plan for the study, and critique its findings.

The study itself would be conducted by professional researchers and experts in foreign policy, members either of an existing research and development organization or, perhaps, drawn together on an *ad hoc* basis under the auspices of a school of international studies.

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93D CONGRESS, 1st Session | SENATE | REPORT No. 93-168

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1973

MAY 22, 1973.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 1317]

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the bill (S. 1317) to authorize appropriations for the United States Information Agency, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The principal purpose of the bill is to authorize funds for FY 1974 for the United States Information Agency to carry out international informational activities under the authority of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, and Reorganization Plan Number 8 of 1953. The following table lists the various categories of USIA activity and shows the Committee's FY 1974 recommendation in comparison with the Administration's request:

[In thousands of dollars]

Purpose	Request	Committee's recommendation	Increase (+) or decrease (−)
I. Salaries and expenses:			
Radio activities	56,083	56,083.0	
Motion picture and TV activities	16,039	14,435.0	−1,604.0
Press and publications activities	28,394	24,542.5	−3,851.5
Information centers, libraries and related activities	40,681	40,681.0	
Program direction, general support and related activities	64,657	54,958.0	−9,699.0
II. Special international exhibitions	4,125	4,125.0	
III. Acquisition and construction of radio facilities	17,000	1,000.0	−16,000.0
Less: Foreign currency balances available	−2,555	−2,555.0	
Total	224,404	193,249.5	−31,154.5

★(Star Print) 83-010

COMMITTEE ACTION

On March 22, the Director of USIA sent to Congress draft legislation which would authorize funding of USIA for FY 1974. The bill was introduced by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, by request, and referred to that Committee. On May 7–8, the Committee held public hearings, at which the following witnesses were heard:

Honorable James Keogh, Director, United States Information Agency; accompanied by Eugene P. Kopp, Deputy Director; and Stanley Silverman, Agency Budget Officer
Kempton B. Jenkins, Assistant Director, Soviet Union and East Europe
Jay W. Gildner, Assistant Director, West Europe
Michael Pistor, Assistant Director, Near East and North Africa
Kent Crane, Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific
Darrell D. Carter, Assistant Director, Latin America
James McGinley, Assistant Director, Africa
Gilbert F. Austin, Assistant Director, South Asia
Kenneth R. Giddens, Assistant Director, Broadcasting (Voice of America)
Harold F. Schneidman, Assistant Director, Information Center Service
Lyle D. Copmann, Assistant Director, Press and Publications
Robert S. Scott, Assistant Director, Motion Picture and Television Service

The bill was considered in executive session on May 14, 1973, and ordered reported with amendments that day by a vote of 16 to 0. Those voting in favor of the motion to report the bill were: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Church, Symington, Pell, Muskie, McGovern, Humphrey, Aiken, Case, Javits, Scott, Pearson, Percy, and Griffin.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

The principal stated mission of the United States Information Agency is to promote better understanding of the United States in other countries. That goal is unchallengeable. In analyzing the Administration's request for continued funding of USIA, however, the Foreign Relations Committee has looked beyond that general statement of purpose to the particular activities in which USIA engages and to the assumptions and values upon which those activities are based. The Committee recognizes that USIA performs a number of valuable functions. But in the Committee's view, there are now two serious questions: (*a*) whether *all* of USIA's activities are worthwhile, and (*b*) whether those that *are* worthwhile might not be performed as well or better under a different system of government organization.

As some members of the Committee have pointed out, it is not a necessary fact of life that there *be* a separate government information agency. Indeed, USIA was founded under very unique historical circumstances—in 1953, a time of widespread belief that the world was an arena in which the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a fateful competition for the allegiance of every uncom-

mitted soul. USIA was an institution created especially to wage that battle.

Prior to 1953, the United States had begun to engage in international information activities—under the authority of the Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. But as authorized by that legislation, the purpose of these activities was primarily to fill the information void that existed in the post-war world: the legislation specifically stated that certain of the activities for which it provided should be *reduced* as commercial sources of information became increasingly available. Over the quarter century since that legislation was passed, the nations of the world have been connected by a myriad of communications activities. Yet USIA, which still derives its basic authority from the 1948 legislation, has continued its operations unabated. Ironically, as the number of private information sources has increased, USIA personnel have gradually come to see themselves as being in "competition" with these other sources—in an effort to "balance the distortions" produced by the normal flow of news and communication. As one Committee member noted, this attitude, translated into a massive effort to avoid being "misunderstood," may well in today's world be projecting the image of a country that is nervous, uncertain, and defensive, and which has no confidence in its ability to inspire confidence in others.

To be sure, many worthwhile functions have come to reside in that agency—the overseas libraries and information centers, for example. But if the times now call for a calmer and quieter approach to the world, as many Members have come to believe, then those useful functions might well be returned to the Department which has traditionally been responsible for representing the United States abroad: the Department of State. With a separate information agency, there will always be the tendency to try to "sell" the United States, whereas in the Committee's view, what is needed today is a more mature, confident approach to the world: making information about ourselves available but not trying to foist it off onto people. We may be far better served if we remove our information and cultural efforts from the realm of sales and returned them to the realm of diplomacy.

The point, as expressed by one Committee member, is not that all of the functions which USIA performs are cold war anachronisms, but rather that the existence of a separate agency oriented toward selling America appears to be one.

With this perspective in mind, there has been discussion within the Committee of what disposition should be made of the agency's activities. Some Members have expressed the view that these activities now fit into three categories: (1) those that should be abolished, (2) those that could be performed as well or better in the State Department, and (3) those that could be performed as well or better by an independent government agency. Into the first category might be placed many of USIA's current motion picture, television, press, and publications activities; some of the Committee members' doubts about these activities are reflected in the Section-by-Section Analysis portion of this report. Into the second category might be placed the administration both of the State Department's cultural exchange program (now performed by USIA) and of the overseas libraries and

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information centers; there is a strong consensus among Committee members in support of these activities. And into the third category might be placed the broadcasting activities of VOA; a number of Committee members hold the view that these operations should first be evaluated and, if their continuance appears justified, serious consideration should be given to removing VOA from the executive branch and establishing it either as a quasi-independent entity or as a division of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

In amending the FY1974 USIA authorization, the Committee has made moderate cuts in certain program areas. Specific reasons for these are discussed later in this report, in the Section-by-Section Analysis. In the Committee's view, these reductions constitute interim action; and over the coming year, the Committee intends to continue its analysis of USIA's proper disposition. The Committee hopes that it will be assisted in this effort by the newly-formed Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, and asks that the Commission focus serious attention upon "the USIA question." The Committee hopes also that the Administration will address this matter and will work *with* the Committee in undertaking a fundamental renovation of our information and cultural programs.

Annex II

Press Release
March 13, 1974

Georgetown University
37th and O Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20057

G.U. Announces Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations

Washington, D.C.—The Rev. R. J. Henle, S.J., president of Georgetown University, today announced the formation of an independent Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations at Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The Panel will be chaired by Frank Stanton, chairman of the American National Red Cross and former President of CBS. Dean Peter Krogh of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service will be vice-chairman, and Walter Roberts, associate director of the U.S. Information Agency, who joins CSIS on April 1, will be the Panel's project director.

The Panel will review the objectives of the U.S. Information, Education and Cultural Relations program, solicit the views of experienced professionals and recommend the most effective program, as well as organizational alignments, for the future.

This study is to be the first thorough inquiry into U.S. overseas information and cultural relations programs since 1960. Several Members of Congress and the two U.S. Advisory Commissions have called for a public reexamination of U.S. policy in these areas. The Panel's report will be made available to relevant committees of the Senate and House, other interested organizations and the public.

The Panel includes members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, chaired by Hobart Lewis, chairman and editor-in-chief, Reader's Digest; members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, chaired by Leonard Marks, former Director of the U.S. Information Agency. In

addition to Frank Stanton, Dean Krogh, Hobart Lewis, Leonard Marks, and Walter Roberts, members of the Executive Committee are: Leo Cherne, Executive Director, Research Institute of America; Andrew Berding, former Assistant Secretary of State; author James A. Michener. Other panelists include: Thomas B. Curtis, David R. Derge, Harry S. Flemming, Rita E. Hauser, William French Smith, William C. Turner, George Gallup, J. Leonard Reinsch, John M. Shaheen, W. Phillips Davison, Edmund A. Gullion, and Kenneth W. Thompson.

Supporters of the project are: Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Lilly Endowment, and Ahmanson Foundation.

Dr. David M. Abshire, chairman of CSIS, is particularly pleased that this project involves the addition of Walter Roberts to the CSIS senior staff as Director of Diplomatic Studies. Mr. Roberts has had a distinguished 30 year career in the foreign affairs of the federal government. He has recently published a book on Yugoslavia, "Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945," which has received a wide variety of favorable notices.

Annex III

List of Individuals Interviewed by Panel

(The views of those interviewed may or may not coincide with the Panel's final conclusions.)

Amerson, Robert C.	Public Affairs Officer
Anderson, Burnett	Public Affairs Officer
Arnold, Philip W.	Public Affairs Officer
Baldyga, Leonard J.	Public Affairs Officer
Ball, George	Former Under Secretary of State
Barnes, Harry G.	Ambassador
Battle, Lucius	Ambassador (ret.); Former Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs
Bernbaum, Maurice	Ambassador (ret.)
Brown, Dean	Deputy Under Secretary of State
Bundy, McGeorge	Former Assistant to the President
Carter, Alan	Public Affairs Officer
Chancellor, John	Former Director of the Voice of America
Clarke, Robert J.	Public Affairs Officer
Cohen, Alvin H.	Deputy Public Affairs Officer
Conahan, Frank G.	General Accounting Office
Coombs, Phillip	Former Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs
Daly, John	Former Director of the Voice of America
Davies, Richard T.	Ambassador
Dickerman, Charles R.	Public Affairs Officer
Dizard, Wilson	United States Information Agency
Dubs, Adolph	Deputy Chief of Mission
Edmondson, William B.	Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State

Fennell, Bernard J.	Public Affairs Officer
Forster, Clifton	United States Information Agency
Frankel, Charles	Former Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs
Free, Lloyd	President, Institute of International Social Research
French, Graham	Cultural Affairs Officer
Garnett, Norris D.	Cultural Affairs Officer
Garrity, Robert W.	United States Information Agency
Giddens, Kenneth	Director, Voice of America
Gilbert, Richard J.	Cultural Affairs Officer
Hanson, Arnold	Public Affairs Officer
Hedges, John L.	Public Affairs Officer
Hess, Clyde G.	Public Affairs Officer
Hillenbrand, Martin J.	Ambassador
Humes, John P.	Ambassador
Ingersoll, Robert	Deputy Secretary of State
Irving, Frederick	Ambassador
Izenburg, Ivan	Public Affairs Officer
Johnson, Millard L.	Cultural Affairs Officer
Joyce, Edward J.	Cultural Affairs Officer
Kaplan, Harold	Formerly United States Information Agency
Keogh, James	Director, United States Information Agency
Key, Richard	Cultural Affairs Officer
Kissinger, Henry	Secretary of State
Klieforth, Alexander A.	Public Affairs Officer
Koch, Kenneth D.	Public Affairs Officer
Kohler, Foy	Ambassador (ret.); Former Director Voice of America
Kopp, Eugene	Deputy Director, United States Information Agency
Laise, Carol	Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Lee, Maurice E.	Public Affairs Officer
Lewinsohn, Joann	Public Affairs Officer
Loomis, Henry	Former Deputy Director, United States Information Agency
McCloskey, Robert	Ambassador at Large
McDonald, James M. Jr.	Deputy Public Affairs Officer
McGinley, James A.	United States Information Agency
McPherson, Harry	Former Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs
Mahoney, Haynes R. Jr.	Public Affairs Officer

Monsen, Richard	United States Information Agency
Muller, William D.	Public Affairs Officer
Nalle, David	Public Affairs Officer
Nelson, Lyle	Chairman, Board of Foreign Scholarships
Noah, Lynn H.	Cultural Affairs Officer
O'Brien, Jack	Formerly United States Information Agency
Pate, Lewis W.	Public Affairs Officer
Payeff, William	United States Information Agency
Perlman, Alvin	American Foreign Service Association
Pettus, James T. Jr.	Public Affairs Officer
Petty, Wilbert C.	Cultural Affairs Officer
Posner, Ben	Former Assistant Director, United States Information Agency
Reddaway, G. F. N.	Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office
Rentschler, James	Public Affairs Officer
Riccio, Robert A.	Cultural Affairs Officer
Richardson, John	Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs
Rogers, William P.	Former Secretary of State
Roth, Lois	American Foreign Service Association
Roth, Richard	Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
Rusk, Dean	Former Secretary of State
Ryan, Hewson	United States Information Agency
Schechter, Edmund	Formerly United States Information Agency
Schmidt, G. Lewis	Formerly United States Information Agency
Shakespeare, Frank	Former Director, United States Information Agency
Staats, Elmer	Comptroller General of the United States
Strausz-Hupe, Robert	Ambassador
Streibert, Theodore C.	Former Director, United States Information Agency
Stryker, Gerald	Public Affairs Officer
Thompson, William F.	Cultural Affairs Officer
Todman, Terence	Ambassador
Tyler, William R.	Ambassador (ret.)
Volpe, John A.	Ambassador
Washburn, Abbott	Former Deputy Director, United States Information Agency

Weathersby, William	Former Deputy Director, United States Information Agency
Weyl, Michael	Cultural Affairs Officer
White, Barbara	Ambassador
Winks, Robin	Former Cultural Attaché
Woods, Elmer G.	General Accounting Office
Zorthian, Barry	Formerly United States Information Agency
Zuckerman, Stanley	American Foreign Service Association

Annex IV

The Origin of USIA

In his first State of the Union message, on February 2, 1953, President Eisenhower asserted the necessity "to make more effective all activities related to international information." The President declared that "a unified and dynamic effort in this whole field is essential to the security of the United States and other peoples in the community of free nations" and added "there is but one sure way to avoid global war and that is to win the cold war."

Legislatively, there were on the books at that time the Fulbright Act of 1946 (P.L. 584, 79th Cong.) and the Smith-Mundt Act (P.L. 402, 80th Cong.) of 1948. The former financed the exchange of professors, students and others out of foreign currency funds accruing from the sale of surplus properties abroad. The latter gave permanent legislative authority to the information program of the Department of State, assigning to it the following objectives:

> To promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and other countries.

It also made possible the use of dollar accounts to finance the exchange of persons. In 1948, also, the Economic Cooperation Administration launched a separate information program to publicize the European recovery program.

A further step to enlarge the scope of overseas information activity was taken in 1950. To the function of promoting "mutual understanding" and a "full and fair picture" of the United States, which were the purposes of the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt Acts, President Truman directed that there be added the "Campaign of Truth."

This mandate constituted a directive to broaden the original intent of the information program into a more dynamic psychological weapon to meet the growing aggressiveness of Communist propaganda.

These shifts in purposes and emphasis in the program reflected themselves in constant changes in organizational structure. From a function under the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, the administration of the information program evolved through a series of reorganizations into a quasi-autonomous unit in January 1952, called the *International Information Administration (IIA)*.

Previously, on February 19, 1951, Senators Wiley and Benton had introduced Senate Resolution 74 (82nd Cong.), proposing a complete study of the information program. That resolution was passed by the Senate on June 30, 1952. It directed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to conduct an investigation and study of the objectives, operations and effectiveness of the overseas information programs of the U.S. A special committee composed of Senator Fulbright as Chairman, and Senators Gillette, Benton, Wiley, Hickenlooper and Mundt as members, was formed to conduct the investigation. It submitted an interim report on January 30, 1953 (S. Report No. 30, 83rd Cong.), which stated that "the overseas information services and programs of the U.S. and private agencies are very important and that they must and can be strengthened." It also recommended continuation of the investigation in order that the full study called for by Senate Resolution 74 could be completed. Senate Resolution 44 (83d Cong.), passed February 20, 1953, continued the special committee until June 30, 1953. The committee now had Senator Hickenlooper as Chairman and Senators Wiley, Knowland, Fulbright, Gillette, Green, Mundt and Hill as members.

On June 15, 1953, the committee submitted its report (No. 406) which contained the following recommendation:

Hickenlooper Committee 1953

(c) Give the International Information Administration greater autonomy within the Department of State for a trial period of one year; or establish it as a separate agency, except that the exchange of persons program should remain in the Department.

The Senate Report states that the "recommendation was arrived at after exploration of all aspects of the administrative problem."

Actually, the special committee had sent an earlier communication (May 8) to President Eisenhower in the form of a resolution of the committee. The text of the letter and resolution follow:

May 8, 1953

Dear Mr. President: The Senate Committee on Overseas Information Programs of the United States today adopted the enclosed resolution setting forth its views on the administrative location of the information programs in the executive branch.

As you know, the committee was created during the last session of Congress and operated under the chairmanship of Senator Fulbright. It was continued this session by Senate Resolution 44. The members are Senators Wiley, Mundt, Knowland, Green, Fulbright, Gillette, Hill and myself.

We respectfully submit these considered views.

Very sincerely yours,
Bourke B. Hickenlooper,
Chairman

Resolution of the Special Committee on Overseas Information Programs of the United States Created by Senate Resolution 74, 82d Congress.

Whereas this committee has conducted a thorough and comprehensive study of the international information and educational exchange programs, it feels justified in submitting to the President the following views:

The committee believes that the complete separation of all international information and educational functions from the Department of State would be inadvisable and would tend to give educational exchange programs a propaganda flavor, nevertheless:

(1) In the event the executive department deems it advisable to separate the overseas information operations from the Department of State and vest them in a new, independent information and propaganda agency at the subcabinet level, the committee strongly recommends that the educational exchange programs remain in the Department of State;

(2) If the executive department does not desire to separate the educational exchange programs from the other information activities, then the committee believes that the programs should be kept together, within the framework of the Department of State, for at least 1 year in order that the new management may have an opportunity for more study before making final determinations of the disposition of these programs. In this event, the committee recommends that the Administrator of the information and educational programs be elevated in his position, within the Department of State, so that he be given greater authority and responsibility in administering the policies and personnel of the programs: It is therefore

Resolved That these views be respectfully transmitted by the chairman to the President for his consideration.

Rockefeller Committee 1953

The reason why the special committee felt it necessary to send the President a communication on the subject of international information lies in the fact that the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization (Rockefeller Committee) had forwarded to the President on April 7, 1953, a Memorandum (No. 14), Subject: Foreign Affairs Organization. In it, Recommendation No. 5 reads as follows:

Establish a new foreign information agency in which would be consolidated the most important foreign information programs and cultural and educational exchange programs now carried on by the United States International Information Administration, by the Technical Cooperation Administration, by the Mutual Security Agency, and by the Department of State in connection with the Government of Occupied Areas.

Recommendation No. 4 reads as follows:

Hereafter the term "Voice of America" should be applied only to statements of the official United States positions, including those on current developments, for use abroad. The State Department should have responsibility for development of this program. The material should be given to a new foreign information agency (to be established as set forth in Recommendation No. 5) for dissemination abroad as directed by the Department of State. No other material, regardless of its nature, origin, or medium used for its dissemination, should be identified as the "Voice of America."

Recommendation No. 5 is explained as follows:

Under this proposal, the major activities for interpreting abroad United States policies and practices (with the exception of formulating material for the official "Voice of America" program which shall be handled as outlined in Recommendation No. 4) together with foreign cultural and educational exchange programs, would be placed under a new foreign information agency. This transfer would not apply to foreign information and educational exchange services which are an integral part of the technical assistance programs. The new agency would be established under the National Security Council under arrangements paralleling those set forth in the National Security Act for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The head of the new agency would be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He would have full administrative authority for the operations of the agency, including development of programs, budget, administrative procedures, and the hiring and dismissal of personnel, but subject to foreign policy as determined by the Secretary of State and to such other instruction as may be furnished by the National Security Council or as the President may direct. With respect to the official Voice of America program, including necessary services of translation, technical preparation, transmission, and distribution, the new agency should provide within its budget.

Since the successful functioning of this agency will depend upon the skill and wisdom of its operations no less than upon its adherence to U.S. foreign policy, it is important that its Director receive expert counsel upon operating procedures. Public Law 402, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, created the United States Advisory Commission on Information and the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange to formulate and recommend to the Secretary of State policies and programs for carrying out this Act, and to report to Congress upon the effectiveness of these efforts. Under the proposed reorganization, these two Commissions logically would counsel the head of the new information agency instead of the Secretary of State. Legislation or action under the Reorganization Plan would be necessary to effect this change.

These Commissions should play an even more active role than in the past, since the collective wisdom and practical experience of their members would be invaluable to the new information agency.

There is a second commission in the field of international educational exchange—the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships, established under Public Law 584. Congress and the Executive Branch might wish to give consideration to the merger of this Board with the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, since both groups operate in the same field.

The head of the new agency would attend meetings of the Psychological Strategy Board when appropriate, and would be authorized to provide staff serviced for the PSB upon foreign information matters.

The authority and responsibility now vested in the Secretary of State pursuant to appropriate National Security Council papers and Executive Orders for inter-departmental coordination of foreign information activities should also be transferred to the new Agency.

The responsibilities now exercised by the Secretary of State with respect to informational media guarantees should be transferred to the head of the information agency by an amendment of Executive Order 10300.

Jackson Committee 1953

Meanwhile, President Eisenhower, under date of January 24, 1953 (four days after inauguration), had established a Committee on International Information Activities which was "authorized and directed to make a survey and evaluation of the international information policies and activities of the Executive Branch of the Government and of policies and activities related thereto with particular reference to the international relations and the national security of this country." The President, in his letter to the Executive Secretary of the NSC, said: "It shall make recommendations to me for such legislative, administrative, or other action respecting the said policies and activities as in its opinion may be desirable. It has long been my conviction that a unified and dynamic effort in this field is essential to the security of the U.S. and of the other peoples in the community of free nations." William H. Jackson was appointed Chairman of the Committee and Robert Cutler, C.D. Jackson, Sigurd Larmon, Gordon Gray, Barklie McKee Henry, John Hughes and Roger Kyes were members. Abbott Washburn was Executive Secretary.

On May 2, 1953, the Jackson Committee sent an interim letter to the President "in view of the recommendations for the reorganization of the International Information Administration which have been placed before you by the Rockefeller Committee and the proposals for the implementation of these recommendations which are now being prepared in the Bureau of the Budget . . . ." (It will be recalled that the Hickenlooper Committee had also sent an interim letter to the President).

After enumerating certain operating principles "regardless of organizational arrangements," the Jackson Committee letter stated:

The Committee has concluded that the most satisfactory arrangement would be to retain within the Department of State those functions now assigned to the International Information Administration and to combine with them the information activities heretofore conducted by MSA and TCA. Under such an arrangement the Committee would favor higher rank for the Administrator of the information agency and provision for autonomy in the selection, assignment and management of personnel and in the control of its own appropriations.

In reaching this conclusion, the Committee has been guided by its conviction that information activities conducted by a free society are necessarily based upon foreign policy and have no life apart from it. The Department of State is primarily responsible for the development of such policies. In the Committee's judgment the creation of an independent agency to conduct foreign information activities, even if provision were made for policy guidance from the Department of State, would risk the emergency of contradictory interpretations of foreign policies. The nature of the problem requires close and frequent interchange during the development of the programs between those responsible for the formulation and conduct of policy and those responsible for its interpretation and projection to foreign audiences. The Committee feels that this problem, which has presented difficulties even while IIA has been within the Department of State, would be further complicated by placing responsibility for the conduct of foreign information activities on an independent agency.

In the interests of the closest possible integration of foreign information activities with the development of foreign policy the Committee would, therefore, prefer to leave the program within the Department of State. The Committee recognizes, however, that there are strong arguments in favor of taking the information program out of the State Department. Inasmuch as the Department itself is reluctant to exercise the operating functions involved, the committee therefore does not oppose the recommendations submitted by the Rockefeller Committee.

The Committee wishes, however, to submit certain comments with respect to the proposed reorganization plan based on the recommendations of the Rockefeller Committee. The Committee concurs in the importance of providing the Director of the new agency on a current basis with full guidance concerning the foreign policy of the United States. It questions, however, the desirability of assigning to the Secretary of State responsibility for the preparation of program material to be utilized on the information media. In the view of the Committee any official statements regarding the position of the United States emanating from the Secretary of State will in the very nature of things be utilized by U.S. information media. It is the conviction of the Committee that program responsibility should rest exclusively with the information agency subject to foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. Accordingly, we recommend that Sec. 202 (b) (2) of the proposed reorganization plan be deleted.

The role of an independent information agency in the conduct of the whole information effort of the U.S. Government and the content of U.S. information programs will be dealt with at greater length in the Committee's final report.

It should be added that the views expressed in the letter of May 2 were not changed in the final report sent to the President with a letter of transmittal dated June 30, 1953. The final report dealt with three alternatives:

1. *The separation of IIA from State and its establishment as an independent agency under the NSC. This agency would also assume the information activities of MSA and TCA.*

This proposal involves the claims that the propaganda function, like the military and economic, is sufficiently different from diplomacy to warrant separate administration; that propaganda should serve national policy, which is made by the member departments of NSC rather than the State Department; and that any information program operated by the State Department will tend to be timid and unimaginative because diplomacy operates primarily through contact between governments, whereas propaganda must involve large scale operations directed at whole peoples.

We believe this proposal is based upon a misconception of propaganda and greatly exaggerates its role in the national effort. Overt propaganda conducted by a free society is necessarily based upon policy and has no life apart from it. While it is true that national security policy is formulated by the member departments comprising the NSC, rather than by State alone, the fact remains that State is primarily responsible for carrying out those policies to which information activities can be of assistance. Moreover, the NSC is not organized to provide day-to-day policy guidance. To create an independent agency to conduct propaganda and related activities, even if some provision were made for policy guidance from the State Department, would be to risk the emergence of contradictory interpretations of foreign policy. Moreover, it would strongly imply the belief that propaganda is a separate element of policy, rather than a subsidiary instrument thereof.

The nature of the propaganda problem requires close and frequent interchange between policy people and operators during the development of a program, and this is difficult when the policy-makers and the propagandists are separated by jurisdictional boundaries. We fear that if IIA were independent, the level of liaison with State would be so high as to leave a number of significant issues of policy to be dealt with by IIA as "operations."

An argument for this proposal to which we attach more weight involves the claim that effective management of IIA is impossible so long as it remains within the State Department. This claim is based upon an antagonism on the part of some political officers in the State Department toward the entire information effort and personnel engaged in it. There is also some evidence of the use of IIA funds for general State Department purposes and refusal to yield the promised autonomy to the Administrator of IIA in the matters of recruiting, assigning, and managing IIA personnel. There is little doubt in our minds that the information program has been administered under great difficulties and we agree that these must, insofar as possible, be removed. However, we are not convinced that a remedy lies in separating IIA from the State Department and re-creating it as an independent agency. The weakness and vulnerability of new, untried government agencies is attested by long experience; the history of OWI is instructive and discouraging on this point. Moreover, we believe that understanding between IIA and the regular political officers of the State Department has been steadily improving and that it is entirely possible to provide the IIA with sufficient administrative flexibility within the State Department to permit effective management.

2. *Retention in State of most of the educational exchange programs and establishment in an independent agency of all "fast media" (radio, press, movies) together with responsibility for the interchange of books and periodicals and aid to libraries and information centers.*

It is the widely held view that the State Department is handling the educational exchange programs very well and that they should accordingly continue to be the responsibility of that Department. The proponents of this proposal accept this view. They argue, however, that those elements of the information program which have a day-to-day impact abroad should be placed in an independent agency. We have rejected this proposal for substantially the same reasons as we rejected the first proposal above—because propaganda should be a servant of policy and should therefore be clearly subject to policy guidance. The "fast media" are precisely the tools which the State Department needs to explain and exploit policy on a day-to-day basis. The library and information center programs are not, of course, propaganda and therefore this line of argument does not apply directly to them. But we would doubt the wisdom of placing segments of the information program under separate administration.

3. *Retention of IIA in State, but with higher rank for the Administrator and with effective provision for autonomy in the selection, assignment and management of personnel and in the control of IIA appropriations.*

It is our conclusion that this proposal embodies a sound approach to the problem of locating and properly organizing the foreign information program. This arrangement facilitates policy guidance and provides the necessary unity of program through the inclusion of all media within a single administration.

In our opinion, the most satisfactory arrangement would be to retain within the Department of State those functions now assigned to the IIA and to combine with them the information activities heretofore conducted by MSA and ICA. Under such an arrangement the Committee would favor higher rank (equivalent to that of Under Secretary) for the Administrator of the information agency and provision for autonomy in the selection, assignment and management of personnel and in the control of its own appropriations.

In the interest of the closest possible integration of foreign information activities with the development of foreign policy, the Committee believes that the program should be left within the Department of State. We recognize, however, that there are strong arguments in favor of taking the information program out of the State Department. Inasmuch as the Department itself is reluctant at this time to exercise the operating functions involved and a reorganization plan has been sent to Congress, the Committee does not make any recommendation on this point.

USIA Created 1953

The final decision to create a U.S. Information Agency was the result of Secretary of State Dulles opposition to retain the IIA in the State Department and the Rockefeller Committee's recommendation that the whole of IIA be severed from the Department.

As a matter of fact, the President did not wait for either the Jackson Committee's or the Hickenlooper Committee's final reports. On June 1, 1953, he submitted Reorganization Plan No. 8 creating USIA minus the exchange of persons program.

He had, by that time, Jackson's interim letter of May 2 and Hickenlooper's interim letter of May 8, neither of which categorically opposed the creation of an independent agency. Jackson

thought it was not a good idea, but he concurred in such a move and Hickenlooper did the same, except that he insisted that the exchange of persons program remain in the Department, an idea which the President accepted.

The Hickenlooper and Jackson Reports, which were submitted June 15 and 30 respectively, did not change the situation.

On June 22, 23 and 24, 1953 the Committee of Government Operations of the House of Representatives held hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 8, because a Resolution had been submitted that the House "does not favor the Reorganization Plan No. 8." The Resolution was not approved.

USIA came into existence on August 1, 1953, and the exchange of persons program became a division in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. (The development of the exchange program into an educational and cultural program under an Assistant Secretary of State is described below.)

It should be stated that the Rockefeller Committee (President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization), which originally recommended the creation of an independent agency, changed its mind in 1958. It proposed in a memorandum to the President dated December 6, 1958, that "the Department of State be reorganized to incorporate the present Department of State, the International Cooperation Administration and the U.S. Information Agency." Specifically, it recommended:

Flemming Report 1958

> The United States Information Agency should be brought into the new Department of State, under the Under Secretary for International Cultural and Information Affairs, with its organization essentially intact; this Under Secretary should also be made responsible for the cultural and exchange programs of the Department, except for the technical exchange activities of the ICA.

After Nelson Rockefeller resigned from the Advisory Committee on Government Organization at the end of December, 1958, (to become Governor of New York), Arthur Flemming took over as Chairman (Milton Eisenhower had been the other Committee member and Don Price now became the third member). The report (thereafter called the Flemming Report) suggested to the President the following action:

> If you are in general agreement with these proposals, Secretary Dulles suggests, and we concur, that as the next step they be discussed at an early date with selected Congressional leaders before firming up a reorganization proposal for transmittal to the Congress. If the reaction of the Congressional leadership is favorable, reference to the need for such reorganization could be included in your State of the Union Message, with indication that a detailed reorganization proposal will be developed for transmittal to the Congress not later than April 1, 1959.

Secretary Dulles, who had objected to having information activities in the Department, apparently was no longer opposed to some integration into State. The man who pushed the return of USIA into the Department was Under Secretary Dillon. Indeed, the Department of State, in the early months of 1959, prepared the necessary legislation. On March 18, 1959, the U.S. Information Agency received the proposed legislation for comment. (At that time Secretary Dulles was on sick leave. He resigned on April 15, 1959). It aimed at returning the Agency to State as "a semi-autonomous organization . . . headed by an Administrator" and reporting directly to the Secretary of State—the status occupied by the International Cooperation Administration which had been returned to State in 1955. The long delay in drafting an appropriate bill resulted in a White House decision on August 14, 1959, not to forward it to Congress because of the latter's hopes to adjourn on September 4.

Sprague Committee 1960

The bill was not sent to Congress at the next session either, presumably because meanwhile President Eisenhower, on December 2, 1959, had established the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee). However, it should be emphasized that the Sprague Committee was specifically enjoined by the President not to "concern itself with those organizational matters dealt with in Chapter 7 of the June 30, 1953 report" (Jackson Committee report). In addition to Mansfield Sprague, members of the Committee were George Allen, Allen Dulles, Gordon Gray, Karl Harr, Jr., John Irwin II, C. D. Jackson, Livingston Merchant and Philip Reed. The Staff Director was Waldemar Nielsen.

Brookings Study 1960

Organizational matters were, however, raised in a Report for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations prepared by the Brookings Institution in 1959. That report was based on Senate Resolution 336, approved July 31, 1958, which authorized a broad study on "The Formulation and Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy."

The Brookings study, which favored the establishment of a Super-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (similar to the Secretary of Defense), with a Secretary of State, a Secretary for Foreign Economic Operations and a Secretary for Information and Cultural Affairs reporting to him, recommended that the Secretary for Information and Cultural Affairs be responsible for all international information and cultural activities but with information and cultural activities as "separate components."

Back in 1957, Senator Mansfield had started a drive to put USIA back into the State Department. He had the support of Senator

Fulbright, Senator Lyndon Johnson, Senator Magnuson and indeed of a majority in the Senate Appropriations Committee which, in its report on the 1958 USIA appropriation, stated the "Committee feels so strongly that there would be considerable economy and efficiency were the Agency to be returned to the control of the State Department that it unanimously recommends that the Foreign Relations Committee consider legislation providing for the transfer of USIA to State." (Congressional Record, May 15, 1957, p. 6990). In his campaign for a return to State, Mansfield used the arguments that the foreign policy guidance of the State Department was "lost" in the independent USIA, that independent agencies in general "mushroom" their activities, work at counterpurposes, permit "snowballing" of personnel and lack central unified operations. (Congressional Record, June 10, 1957, p. 8595). Furthermore, he maintained that this resulted in "dualism" and that "it is to be regretted that the Secretary of State is a foremost advocate of this situation." Senator Fulbright feared that "a Frankenstein and a monster" may have been created and that "the quicker we place the agency under responsible control in the State Department the better so far as I am concerned."

The campaign to put USIA back into the Department followed a speech by USIA Director Arthur Larson, on April 16, 1957 in Honolulu, in which he said: "Throughout the New and Fair Deals, this country was in the grip of a somewhat alien philosophy, imported from Europe." The Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations dealing with USIA, and chaired by Senator Lyndon Johnson, subsequently cut the USIA appropriation to $90 million - $50 million below the administration request. (The final figure was $96 million).

President Eisenhower writes (*The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961*, p. 138) that he "discussed the USIA with Secretary Dulles and the mounting congressional pressure to have it transferred to the State Department." He added:

> I was somewhat inclined toward approving such a transfer because it seemed to be the only way to get sufficient money to support the Agency's necessary functions. Foster, however, did not think any such radical move was necessary. The State Department, he felt, should not become a collection of operating agencies. It should confine itself to foreign policy formulation, advice, and execution. I authorized the Secretary to hold to his position.

The solution of the dilemma—the Democratic leadership in the Senate pushing for return of USIA to State and the Secretary of State opposing it—was Eisenhower's appointment of one of the most senior State Department Foreign Service officers, Ambassador George V. Allen, to head the USIA (November, 1957). By the end of the following year, however, as shown earlier, the effort to put the Agency back into the Department had received the endorsement of

the Rockefeller Committee and, indeed, was no longer objected to by Dulles.

In view of all these events and, particularly, the fact that several powerful Democratic Senators favored the return of USIA to the Department, it was widely expected that President Kennedy would take such a step upon assuming office.

Free-Davison Task Force 1960

Immediately after his election, he asked George Ball and the latter's law partner, John Sharon, to set up several task forces, one of which dealt with USIA and was chaired by Lloyd Free and W. Phillips Davison. That Task Force finished its work in less than two months. It recommended that USIA remain an independent agency, reporting directly to the President; that the USIA Director be designated as chief advisor to the President and to members of the Cabinet on the psychological aspects of international problems; that the Director be invited to attend Cabinet meetings on a regular basis; that the Director become an *ex officio* member of the NSC, pending statutory membership; that under the NSC be established a Committee on Information and Exchange Policy, consisting of the USIA Director, the Under Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA, the CIA Director, the ICA Director and one or two public members. The Task Force further recommended that the exchange of persons programs and the cultural presentation programs be transferred from the State Department to USIA; that the educational programs of ICA and the International Trade Fairs of Commerce also be transferred to USIA; that this new agency be renamed the *International Exchange Agency* or the *U.S. Cultural Exchange Agency*; and that the new agency be organized into three major operating divisions for Educational, Cultural and Information Activities.

The Task Force Report, as well as similar recommendations by Donald Wilson and Tom Sorensen, appeared to have persuaded Kennedy not to put USIA back into the State Department. On the other hand, he did not act on the proposal made by the Task Force, Wilson and Sorensen, to take the exchange of persons and cultural presentations programs out of State and transfer them to USIA. Sorensen writes (*The Word War*, p. 122) that Kennedy told him in early January that "whatever the merits of the case, Senator Fulbright would not stand for USIA absorption of the State Department's educational and exchange programs and no organizational changes of that nature would be made." (On the contrary, Kennedy not only left the cultural exchange program in the State Department but elevated it by appointing an Assistant Secretary to run it).

In 1968, the Republican Coordinating Committee produced a report entitled "The American Image Abroad" which Senator Howard Baker introduced into the *Congressional Record* (February 5, 1968). It recommended that the "U.S. Information and Exchange programs should be merged in a single organization; long range educational and cultural programs, which need far greater emphasis, should be transferred from the Department of State to USIA." It added:

Republican Coordinating Committee Proposals 1968

> Transfer of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs from the Department of State to USIA would permit a unified psychological operation, facilitate a proper mix of programs in each foreign country and reduce administrative duplication. Transfer of the Bureau would also relieve the Secretary of State of a serious administrative burden and enable the Director of USIA to concentrate on developing effective long-range programs.

Otherwise, there seemed to have been no statements regarding USIA in the 1968 campaign. In the 1972 campaign there apparently was only one reference to USIA. In a speech delivered by the Democratic Vice Presidential candidate at Temple University on October 4, 1972, Sargent Shriver said that "the U.S. Information Agency, the foreign activities of our domestic departments such as the Treasury, Commerce, Labor and Agriculture—and most important, the CIA—should be under the direct control of the State Department."

In 1973, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the USIA Authorization Bill, stated:

Senate Report 1973

> The Committee recognizes that USIA performs a number of valuable functions. But in the Committee's view, there are now two serious questions: (a) whether *all* of USIA's activities are worthwhile, and (b) whether those that *are* worthwhile might not be performed as well or better under a different system of government organization. As some members of the Committee have pointed out, it is not a necessary fact of life that there *be* a separate government information agency.

After tracing the history of USIA, and commenting on its activities, the Committee's report states that some Members

> have expressed the view that these activities now fit into three categories: (1) those that should be abolished, (2) those that could be performed as well or better in the State Department, and (3) those that could be performed as well or better by an independent government agency. Into the first category might be placed many of USIA's current motion picture, television, press, and publications activities; some of the Committee members' doubts about these activities are reflected in the Section-by-Section Analysis portion of this report. Into the second category might be placed the administration both of the State Department's cultural exchange program (now performed by USIA) and of the overseas libraries and information centers; there is a strong consensus among Committee members in support of these activities. And into the third category might be placed the broadcasting activities of VOA; a number of Committee members hold the view that these operations should

first be evaluated and, if their continuance appears justified, serious consideration should be given to removing VOA from the executive branch and establishing it either as a quasi-independent entity or as a division of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

Back in 1968, Senator Fulbright had called for appointment of a high level commission to recommend what he called "necessary organizational reforms in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy." He specified the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency as subjects of the study.

After some delay, Congress established, in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972, the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy because, as the Foreign Relations Committee report says, "during the last quarter of a century there has been a proliferation of agencies of the U.S. Government with respect to the formulation, management, and conduct of, and the collection of information relating to the nation's foreign policy." The mandate of the Commission is

Murphy Commission 1973

> to study and investigate the organization, methods of operation, and power of all departments, agencies, independent establishments, and instrumentalities of the U.S. Government participating in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy and to make recommendations which the Commission considers appropriate to provide improved governmental processes and programs in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy . . .

The Commission, consisting of twelve members, four appointed by the President, four by the President of the Senate, and four by the Speaker of the House, was formed in 1973, and its report is due on June 30, 1975. Its chairman is Ambassador (ret.) Robert Murphy.

In 1968, a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Representative Fascell, had written a report on the future of U.S. Public Diplomacy (Report No. 6, dated December 20, 1968). The report did not recommend any organizational changes but believed "that a thorough, systematic reappraisal of the entire information policy of the U.S. Government should be undertaken."

On July 10, 1969, Congressman Fascell introduced H. R. 12722 "To establish a Committee to examine the overseas information activities of the United States Government." The duty of the Committee, according to the bill, was to

> review the objectives, the organization and the operations of all informational, educational, cultural and related activities of the U.S. Government in foreign countries; to assess the relevance and the effectiveness of such activities in terms of the support which they provide for the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives; to examine the extent to which foreign public opinion is considered in the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy, and the manner in which this is done; and to submit its findings and recommendations.

The Committee was to be composed of nine members—one Senator, one Representative, one NSC member, one State Department member, one USIA member, one member of the Advisory Commission on Information, and three individuals from private life "with knowledge and experience in the fields of information, education and cultural affairs, one of whom the President shall designate as Chairman."

The bill died in committee and, in any case, was later superseded by the bill which established the Murphy Commission.

The Origin of CU

When the USIA was created in 1953, the exchange of persons program, one of IIA's divisions, remained in the Department of State and was organizationally placed directly under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. Also placed in the P area was the staff of the UNESCO National Commission. In 1954, the President's Special International Program for Cultural Presentation was initiated with funds requested of Congress by President Eisenhower. It, too, was placed under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. That program was made permanent in 1956 by the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act. A Cultural Planning and Coordination Staff was established in the Bureau of Public Affairs.

Also in 1956, President J.L. Morrill of the University of Minnesota, in a report to the State Department, recommended the creation of the position of Assistant Secretary of State to be Coordinator for Cultural and Technical Exchange with clear authority to harmonize the exchange programs of State and ICA and the relationship of both with the academic community and other non-government groups. Subsequently, Under Secretary Herter became very interested in this aspect, and in December, 1958, Robert H. Thayer was appointed to the position of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Cultural Relations. In addition, Thayer was given the task to set up a Bureau of International Cultural Relations. That Bureau came into existence in June, 1959. The exchange program and related functions, including UNESCO Staff, were transferred from the Public Affairs area to the new bureau, headed by Thayer.

The then Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Andrew Berding, supported this move. He said: "Cultural relations are without any doubt sufficiently important unto themselves to warrant their being placed in a separate bureau under the full time direction of an Assistant Secretary of State." (*Foreign Affairs and You*, p. 212). However, since no Assistant Secretaryship was available then, Thayer retained the Special Assistant title, though he had the Assistant Secretary rank.

In February, 1961, President Kennedy, who had had several recommendations to put CU into USIA but also had a number of expert reports recommending a contrary line of action, decided to follow the latter course and elevated the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs by making an Assistant Secretaryship available. Philip H. Coombs was named Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Later in the year, Public Law 87-256, 87th Congress (the Fulbright-Hays Act) was passed by Congress and became law on September 21, 1961. The law says:

> The purpose of this Act is to enable the Government of the United States to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange; to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.

Annex V

The following letter from Dean Edmund A. Gullion, a member of the Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations, was received March 10 after advance copies of the final text of the Report had been distributed (prior to the press conference March 11, 1975). Also reproduced is the response of the Chairman of the Panel to Dean Gullion.

TUFTS UNIVERSITY
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March 7, 1975

Dr. Frank Stanton
Chairman
Panel on International Information,
Education and Cultural Relations
The Center for Strategic and International
Studies
Eighteen Hundred K Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Dr. Stanton:

While I believe the Panel you have directed with characteristic vigor, competence and conscience has performed a true public service in its examination of the United States overseas information effort, I must dissent from some of the main tendencies of its review.

I do not subscribe to the parcelling out of the *corpus* of the United States Information Agency to different sectors of the Department of State.

I do not believe this would be in the best interest of the effective conduct of foreign relations nor of what can be termed the function of "public diplomacy."

Nor do I think the time is ripe for it no matter how much the move might superficially appear to commend itself in response to a perceived change in the international scene or, less fundamentally, to a desire for administrative compactness, regularity and economy.

Granted the never-quite-satisfied need for better coordination of policy and information, I yet believe there are good reasons for preserving a more fundamental distinction between the information function and the diplomatic and policy development function, at home and in the field, than such a merger would permit.

It is necessary to recognize a clear line between traditional government-to-government diplomacy and those forms of people-to-people diplomacy which increasingly characterize international *and* intercultural relations. The former is in my view still the core of

the conduct of foreign relations. It involves precision, confidentiality, political and economic expertise, negotiation and reporting, and the exercise of such influence as we can still wield, unless we have completely mistaken détente for disengagement.

The conduct of public diplomacy, on the other hand, is addressed to groups outside government who play roles of varying levels of importance in the affairs of their countries and whose contacts with similar groups in other countries are knotted increasingly within the tightening web of communications.

Some people are good for one thing, some for another. I need not in this space catalogue the differences in vocation and aptitude, but may it suffice to say that the information or cultural officer is more typically engaged with a broader audience and is less closely identified with the policy of his government. He deals with different kinds of people and the mode of discourse and the techniques for effective communication differ greatly from those of government-to-government diplomacy.

Working at some small remove from the Embassy and the formal apparatus of advocacy and representation gives the public diplomatist more latitude, flexibility and occasionally more acceptability; at the same time, as Harold Nicholson pointed out and as some of us with field experience can testify, the Chief of Mission and his political section can sometimes use some space between them and the press and information officers.

Abroad, both concerns come together and can be concerted in the "Country Team." Presumably a coordination as effective as is sometimes achieved in this field group is what the Panel aims at for Washington. But if you move the USIA into the Department, I fear some other things will happen:

(a) The difference in function which I claim to be a good thing will be lost or blurred.

(b) If I know the *ethos* of the Department there will develop a hierarchy of function with the political and economic taking precedence over informational. Your best informational officers will aim for the political cone, conforming themselves over time to its concepts and mores. The political cone will undertake to ingest information; how they will put it out is a different speculation. Your propagandist, if that is not a pejorative term, will take on the coloration of the careerist.

(c) Paradoxically, while the thrust of the report is toward centralization of agencies, you also move to fragment function. The fields of "information," "culture" and "education" are not

separable and mutually exclusive. All are part of public diplomacy and need to draw upon one another to be most effective and appealing. The Panel would appear to put them on separate tracks subject to separate direction. Those thematic programs which USIA has done with particular skill utilizing radio, films, press articles, exhibits, and lectures would come off least well in the divided system.

(d) Again paradoxically, the role of information in support of foreign policy objectives could be weakened and not strengthened after a move into State. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the Department has done a perceptive and imaginative job in diffusing abroad the merits and opportunities of our culture and our educational system. But is it geared to grappling with contentious issues and to defending our system? Or is it thought that this was never the function of information or that it is so no longer?

I believe we have been most effective when we have presented our case objectively but have nonetheless presented a case. Why else is USIA in the business?

And I believe the need for that presentation is as great if not greater than it ever was. We are already losing ground.

There is nothing I see either in the assumptions or the progress of "détente" which would warrant the dismantling of one of our key foreign affairs agencies. The Soviet Union and those states which follow that model have not relaxed but rather tightened their control in the information they allow to reach their own peoples. Soviet citizens like Sakharov and Solzhenitzyn have testified to their dependence on foreign sources, a phenomenon replicated in numerous other instances on several continents.

What détente has done along with the good is to multiply the opportunities the Soviet Union and others have to carry their own informational efforts to more peoples. Moreover, in the world of emerging and developing countries, newly politicized masses are choosing the systems under which they will live. Of course they are free to choose but they should be aware of the choices.

To many of these our system already seems less attractive than it did, our commitment to our own ideals less sure, our will and our arm less strong. This is not the time to relax our informational effort nor to lose it in the arcane recesses of the Department. Members of the Panel would doubtless say this is not the intention. But I believe that it will be so perceived and that that will be the effect.

Much of the foregoing analysis applies equally to the future of the

Voice of America. If it is moved into closer relation to the Department of State, I believe both it and the Department would suffer. It would be harder for VOA to preserve its aura of objectivity and detachment while the difficulties that might arise in trying to reconcile fast moving news coverage with Department clearances boggle the mind.

As for the Department, our "ministry of external affairs," I doubt that it really wants to be hitched to a broadcast station.

The proposal which would place VOA under an "independent" board would, I think, go too far in the opposite direction. True, it would become "less political" but it very probably would have to abandon its function of providing commentary in support of United States foreign policy, and with it, its most important rationale for support by the American taxpayer.

It would contribute to the fragmentation, rather than the consolidation, of American public diplomacy. The present structure, while imperfect, permits one VOA function, namely furnishing support for American foreign policy, to coexist with another, equally important, the providing of factual news to millions who otherwise would be deprived.

Finally, and without trying here to embark on a separate series of recommendations, I would seek to conserve an organization to which you yourself have contributed so much over many years, which has pioneered a new kind of diplomacy and deployed it for peace, and which has known how to adapt itself to change. I would move to give that agency what it has not known in its lifetime—some kind of tenure—and then I would try to define and perfect its relations to the purposes of our people and the departments and agencies of our government.

Sincerely yours,

Edmund A. Gullion
Foreign Service Officer and
Career Minister (Retired)
Dean

EAG/aw

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Dean Edmund A. Gullion
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March 15, 1975

Dear Ed:

As you know, your letter of March 7 arrived March 10 after we had distributed advance copies of the Panel's final report and recommendations to the press. Inasmuch as Jim Keogh quoted you in the prepared statement he released immediately following the issuance of our Report, we are reproducing your "dissent" together with this response in the official printed copies of the Report.

Now that I have had an opportunity to reread your 3½ page letter, I feel I should comment on it in greater detail. But before I do so, I want to say again how much I regret your inability to work with us throughout our project.

I am equally distressed that you feel we are "parcelling out" USIA activities to different sectors of the Department of State. It seems to me it is clear in the Panel's Report that we are not recommending anything of the sort. We are proposing to transfer one function of USIA to the Department. Conversely, we are proposing to transfer *from* the Department the entire CU function. In other words, on a "balance of functions" basis we are taking more out of the Department than we are putting in. Thus your letter is based on the fallacious premise that the Panel is recommending, in your words, "moving the USIA into the Department." You are thereby dissenting from something we are not proposing.

On page 18 of the Report you will see that the Panel rejected the integration of the Information and Cultural Affairs Agency into the Department for reasons which are similar to the ones you give for keeping the program separate from State. One of our models is ACDA which, as you know, is an agency *outside* the Department even though its Director reports to the Secretary of State.

As to the Voice, we do not recommend its transfer to the State Department as you imply.

In your letter you make the distinction between government-to-government diplomacy and people-to-people diplomacy. In that over-simplification you fail to address one other important function of public diplomacy: government-to-people diplomacy. It was that function which occupied so much time in our interviews and in our deliberations. A large section of our Report is devoted to that aspect and its basic distinction from what you call people-to-people diplomacy.

Your analysis of people-to-people diplomacy to a large extent coincides with the reasoning in our Report. Had we had the benefit of your thoughts, we doubtless would have included them in our version. The same is true for your proposition that detente does not diminish the necessity for our information and cultural program. In the Panel's Report you will find several passages which make the same point.

Finally, I know the Panel members would have profited from your counsel had you been able to participate in our meetings. And by the same token, I am persuaded that you would have written a different letter had there been more dialogue among us.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely,

Frank Stanton